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Legal pluralism - defined as a situation in which "more than one legal
system operate(s) in a single political unit"' - is a practical reality in a large
number of countries in the world, most notably in the post-colonial states of
Africa. These newly-independent states are grappling with how to
preserve the cultural heritage reflected in their customary law and
institutions, 2 even as they attempt to function as modern constitutional
regimes.' Many of their constitutions preserve a role for customary law or
recognize the inevitability of legal pluralism in the state. But few have
found a functional and effective way of implementing legal pluralism or,
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1. BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE: LAW,
GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION 89 (2nd ed. 2002).
2. "Newly" refers to the last fifty years or so. The decolonization of Africa began with
Libya in 1951, and only a handful of countries achieved independence before 1960. David
Birmingham et al., ENCYCLOP)EDIA BRITANNICA, Freedom from Empire: An Assessment of Post-




3. Manfred 0. Hinz, Traditional Governance and African Customary Law: Comparative
Observations from a Namibian Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS & THE RULE OF LAW IN NAMIBLA 59,
61-62 (N. Horn & A. Bosi eds., 2007), available at http://www.unam.na/centres/
hrdc/3_traditional-governance andAfrican customarylaw.pdf ("There is no African
country that is free of African traditions or free of at least some elements that belong to
western modernity. It is therefore that African governments have . . . to make decisions about
the legal and political position of both tradition and modernity in their social and legal
system.").
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more specifically, defining the relationships between the pluralistic
institutions.
This Article attempts to define the challenges and opportunities
associated with linking statutory and customary adjudication. In order to
assess the various approaches to the problem, it is necessary to evaluate the
appropriate goals and purposes of legal pluralism, distinguishing the
motivations of many who have exploited pluralistic systems for their own
self-interest. It is also necessary to recognize and preserve the virtues
inherent in customary systems, which have been historically undervalued
as "primitive," and remain under attack by those who see them as a threat
to the protection of human rights.
Striking these balances to implement legal pluralism in Mozambique
presents serious, but by no means unique, challenges. Mozambique's
current situation serves as a case in point for application of the principles
developed in this Article.
The best approach for Mozambique and other similarly situated states
will be to maximize the role and independence of customary law and the
institutions that apply it. Balances will have to be struck to ensure that
human rights are not unduly compromised as a result. Such balancing will
require a procedure by which customary court decisions can be reviewed
for consistency with constitutional protections. This review can be
accomplished without giving statutory courts jurisdiction to interpret and
apply customary law. This will allow the customary law, and its
application, to remain solely the province of traditional authorities, where it
can continue to function as a vital and highly adaptive foundation for rural
society.
The Article proceeds in five Parts. First, it introduces the concept of
legal pluralism and discusses its inevitability. Second, it explores the
various uses of legal pluralism, the opportunities it presents, and the both
positive and negative agendas it serves. Third, it identifies three different
conceptual approaches to legal pluralism, critiquing each and suggesting a
productive reconciliation of them, aimed at realizing the benefits and
minimizing the negative aspects of legal pluralism. This third section
includes a specific procedural approach to reconciling the conflict between
respecting indigenous culture and promoting human rights. Fourth, it
explores the often-overlooked issue of jurisdiction, fundamental to the
structure of a legal pluralism regime. It surveys options and approaches,
and analyzes the implications of each for legal pluralism. Finally, it
proposes an application of these principles to the country of Mozambique
primarily as a case in point. Like many post-colonial states, Mozambique
formally recognizes customary law; and like almost all of them, it has a
constitution with a Bill of Rights. In addition, it retains the remnants of the
Portuguese legal regime and its post-colonial experiment with socialism,
further enriching the pluralism at play. This makes it an ideal example to
illustrate the application of these principles. But this discussion is
meaningful not only for Mozambique. The theory and proposal should be
applicable, mutatis mutandis, throughout post-colonial Africa, and should be
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worthy of consideration wherever indigenous justice is practiced.
I. LEGAL PLURALISM: A CONTEMPORARY REALITY
In any society, and any state, the legal system will reflect a melange of
doctrines, institutions, and practices reflective of that country's history,
culture, and politics. In many countries, these eclectic influences have been
harmonized into a unitary system of justice.
The common law, after all, could be characterized as a type of
customary law, uncodified, and evolving as it was applied. Over time, the
common law has gravitated toward a statutory tradition, with the
overwhelming majority of legal standards and rules coming from codes
rather than cases.4  The customary, common law tradition is still
meaningful, mostly providing the backdrop for the application of codes,
filling the gaps in the law, and providing a basis for judicial interpretation
of statutes.5 But most common law states now apply statutory law, born of
and influenced by the customary roots of the common law, and fully
harmonized with it.6
But where the harmonization has not occurred - as in many post-
colonial states - the tensions created in the intersection of inconsistent, even
competing, systems are acute. In most African states, the key tensions arise
between a statutory system, a creation of legislation, and the more organic
customary or traditional systems, each with unique laws and institutions to
enforce them. For purposes of this Article, the term "customary law" is
used to describe these systems. It is defined as unwritten law, retained by
oral tradition and by acceptance and observance by the community or
society to which it applies.7
4. See Theodor Meron, Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 817, 821
(2005) (" [Clodification of criminal prohibitions is the modern norm in domestic systems, even
in common law countries - in the United States, for example, there are no common law crimes,
and in the United Kingdom there are few."). See also JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO
PEREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 27 (3d ed. 2007).
5. See, e.g., Suzanne Mounts, Malice Aforethought in California: A History of Legislative
Abdication and Judicial Vacillation, 33 U.S.F. L. REv. 313, 315 (1999) ("On their own, the homicide
statutes made little sense; they could only be understood with reference to the pre-existing
common law they reflected.").
6. See James E. Archibald, Pledges of Voluntary Contributions to the United Nations by
Member States: Establishing and Enforcing Legal Obligations, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 317, 332
(2004) ("Codes in common law countries are developed on a more ad hoc basis and often
include provisions that reflect decisions in prior court cases.") (citing JAMES G. APPLE & ROBERT
P. DEYLING, FED. JUDICIAL CIR, A PRIMER ON THE CIVIL-LAW SYSTEM 36 (1995),
http://www.qc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/CivilLaw.pdf/$file/CivilLaw.pdf).
7. See Ike Ehiribe, The Validity of Customary Law Arbitration in Nigeria, 18 COMP. L. Y.B. OF
INT'L Bus. 131, 132 (Dennis Campbell & Susan Cotter eds., 1996) (describing customary law as
"an amalgam of customs or habitual practices accepted by members of a particular community
as having the force of law as a result of long established usage."). The fact that customary law
is unwritten is important. While there have been attempts to codify it, the law ceases to be
customary when it is written down; at that point, the source of law is no longer the custom of
the community, but the text of the code. I have argued elsewhere that it is impossible to
record customary law without doing violence to it, undermining its unique and powerful
positive attributes, most notably its adaptability. David Pimentel, Rule of Law Reform Without
2011] 61
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There is nothing inherently wrong with legal pluralism,8 and certainly
nothing new about it. The concept is ancient, having been an issue
wherever competing societies have overlapped, including undoubtedly the
earliest instances of conquest and occupation.9 It has always proved easier
to govern a conquered people according to their own laws.1 0
In Mozambique, the historical and political milieu is particularly rich.
The legal system is influenced not only by traditional or customary law and
Portuguese colonialism, but also by the post-independence socialist regime
and, after the latter's collapse, its abrupt replacement with a new capitalist
democracy." Various legal institutions have survived this history,
including hybrid institutions such as the community courts,12 created by
statute but not otherwise funded or governed by state organs. To the extent
these divergent doctrines, institutions, and practices persist today and co-
exist unhomogenized and unharmonized, Mozambique already functions
as a legally pluralistic society.
Formal recognition of legal pluralism, moreover, legitimizes traditional
systems, validating the cultural values that underlie them. Indeed,
Mozambique has chosen to embrace legal pluralism in its new Constitution
of Mozambique, adopted in 2004. Article 4, entitled "Legal Pluralism," and
also Article 212(3) specifically contemplate linking statutory courts and
non-state dispute resolution fora:
Article 4
Legal Pluralism
The State recognises the different normative and dispute resolution
systems that co-exist in Mozambican society, insofar as they are not
contrary to the fundamental principles and values of the
Constitution. . . .;
Article 212
Jurisdictional Function
(3) The law may establish institutional and procedural mechanisms
for links between courts and other forums whose purpose is the
Cultural Imperialism? Reinforcing Customary Justice Through Collateral Review in Southern Sudan,
2 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 1, 21 (2010) ("Attempts at codification and even ascertainment,
therefore, may end up threatening customary law far more than they strengthen it.")
[hereinafter Pimentel, Rule of Law Reform Without Cultural Imperialism].
8. However, it has been argued that "[t]here is nothing inherently good, progressive, or
emancipatory about 'legal pluralism'" either. BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, supra note 1, at
89. Discussion at Part Ill, infra, illustrates some positive aspects of the legally pluralistic
regime, particularly in the context of post-colonial African states.
9. See, e.g., infra note 33 (discussion of Biblical accounts of the Roman occupation of
Israel).
10. See discussion infra Part Ill.
11. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, The Heterogeneous State and Legal Pluralism in
Mozambique, 40 LAW AND Soc'Y REV. 39, 47-48 (2006).
12. See discussion of community courts infra Part VI.A.
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settlement of interests and the resolution of disputes.13
These provisions are not particularly remarkable, as similar provisions
exist in a number of other African Constitutions.14 Moreover, the specifics
and the mechanics of how "different normative and dispute resolution
systems" can co-exist and function in a modern state is nowhere articulated
in Mozambique, other than to allow the "law" to establish them.15
Given these constitutional provisions, the question is not whether
Mozambique, and so many of its neighbors, should operate under a system
of legal pluralism - indeed, pluralism is deemed inevitable, even desirable.
The remaining question, as yet unanswered, is how that regime should be
structured and implemented and, specifically, what linkages should and
must be established between the customary and statutory systems. To
answer that question, it is necessary to understand why legal pluralism is
important and what societal values it represents.
II. TilE WHY OF LEGAL PLURALISM
A. Legal Pluralism and the Rule of Law
A sound, stable, and predictable legal system might be characterized as
one that reflects the rule of law. Often mentioned with reference to its
value in fostering economic development, discussed separately below, 16
rule of law also incorporates much broader, less tangible values: peace,
security, equity, justice, and the protection of basic human rights. A key
perspective, for purposes of this discussion, focuses on the role of legal
pluralism in the establishment of the rule of law in the post-colonial
society.17  Notoriously difficult to define, "rule of law" has been
13. CONST. OF THE REP. OF MOZAM. arts. 4, 212(3) (2004).
14. See, e.g., Johanna E. Bond, Constitutional Exclusion and Gender in Commonwealth Africa,
31 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 289, 292-93 (2008) (discussing constitutional provisions that specifically
recognize customary law: "Despite the marked trend toward increased constitutional
protection for women's rights, a number of countries in the region have retained clauses that
exclude personal and customary law . . . from constitutional non-discrimination protection.").
See also Vanessa Jim~nez & Tim Murithi, CENTRE FOR CONFLicT RESOL., SOUTH SUDAN WITHIN
A NEW SUDAN 26 (2006), http://www.ccr.org.za/images/stories/pdfs/Vol_13-
SudanFinal_211106.pdf ("The [Interim Constitution for Southern Sudan] also guarantees a role
for traditional authorities and recognises customary laws regarding community land tenure.
Articles 174 and 175 guarantee respect for the 'institution, status and role of traditional
authority,' and call upon Southern courts to apply customary law.").
15. CONST. OF THE REP. OF MOZAM. art. 212(3) (2004).
16. See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
17. One might note the overlap between the economic development discussion and the
rule of law discussion, observing that the rule of law is precisely what is required to support
economic development. They are treated separately here because rule of law is a far broader
concept, encompassing access to justice for the rural poor, as well as a range of human rights
concerns, such as child protection and gender equity. Although the foundation for economic
development could have been characterized as a sub-topic under rule of law in general, it gets
separate treatment here because of its vital importance. This author has been drawn into too
many rule of law discussions, particularly when serving as the Head of Rule of Law for
Southern Sudan for the UN Mission in Sudan, have focused solely on human rights and due
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characterized as:
[A] state of affairs . . . in which most people, most of the time,
choose to resolve disputes in a manner consistent with procedurally
fair, neutral, and universally applicable rules, and in a manner that
respects fundamental human rights norms .... [Tjhis requires. . . a
widely shared cultural and political commitment to the values
underlying [its] institutions and codes.18
Consistent with this, the rule of law demands regularity and predictability,
as well as the resort to official dispute resolution regimes to manage
conflict, rather than vigilantism or private retaliation.
Access to justice is a major rule of law deficiency in many post-colonial
African states. Large populations in these countries have no means of
getting to urban centers where statutory courts are situated.' 9 Even if they
can get to the city, few can afford the representation or legal advice that
may be necessary to navigate the formal justice system.20 Unless they can
get their dispute resolved locally, in their own village or community, their
claim is likely to go unheard.
This is certainly true in Mozambique. 21 A 2006 Open Society Initiative
report on the rule of law in Mozambique observed:
On balance, despite its reform efforts, the state is unable to
guarantee access to justice for its citizens, particularly those living
in remote areas. The reality for most Mozambicans is that the
judicial courts are inaccessible, blocked by a range of obstacles
including financial constraints and their physical location. As a
result, many citizens continue to rely on alternative mechanisms of
dispute resolution, including community courts and traditional or
other local leaders. 22
The reliance on such traditional systems is evidence of the public
confidence those systems enjoy.23 Public confidence, a staple of the rule of
process issues, without giving sufficient or meaningful attention to the economic development
interests so vital to alleviating human suffering or improving the human condition in the
developing world.
18. JANE STROMSETH, DAVID WIPPMAN & ROSA BROOKS, CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS?
BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 78 (2006).
19. OPEN SOC'Y INITIATIVE FOR S. AFR., MOZAMBIQUE: JUSTICE SECTOR AND THE RULE OF
LAW 121 (2006), available at http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/
Mozambique%20Justice%20report%20(Eng).pdf; Pimentel, Rule of Law Reform Without Cultural
Imperialism, supra note 7, at 14-15 (making similar observations about Southern Sudan).
20. Id.
21. It is true in Southern Sudan as well. Pimentel, Rule of Law Reform Without Cultural
Imperialism, supra note 7, at 14-15.
22. OPEN SOC'Y INIT IATIVE FOR 5. AFR., supra note 19.
23. V. B0EGE ET AL., BERGHOF RES. CENTER FOR CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICT MGMT., ON
HYBRID POLITICAL ORDERS AND EMERGING STATES: STATE FORMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF
"FRAGILITY" 9-10 (2008), htt-p://berghof-handbook.net/documents/publications/
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law, is elusive, and more easily lost than acquired. To the extent that
traditional fora enjoy that confidence, those institutions must be retained
and strengthened as a part of the larger rule of law strategy.24
Finally, traditional dispute resolution is very inexpensive, particularly
when contrasted with the resources required to establish and maintain
statutory courts. This applies to community courts in Mozambique as well,
which have a hybrid character, 25 having been established by statute but
abandoned by the Ministry of Justice. They are "an important mechanism,
providing access to justice for many citizens," 26 and presently function on
minimal budgets, none of it coming from official state coffers. 27 Given
resource constraints in a relatively impoverished nation, the state cannot
afford to replace them with state institutions.
The importance of legal pluralism to the rule of law in such countries is,
therefore, readily apparent, given the vital role traditional fora play in
resolving disputes in these remote and rural communities. Legal pluralism
that retains and respects traditional and customary courts is essential to
establishing and maintaining the rule of law in such areas.28 Whatever
boege etallead.pdf. The authors explain:
People do not perceive themselves as citizens or nationals (at least not in
the first place). They define themselves instead as members of particular
sub- or trans-national social entities (kin group, tribe, village). This is
particularly true where state agencies are not present on the ground and
the state does not deliver any services with regard to education, health
infrastructure or security. Rather, it is the community that provides the
nexus of order, security and basic social services. People have confidence
in their community and its leaders, but they have no trust in the
government and state performance. The "state" is perceived as an alien
external force, far away not only physically (in the capital city), but also
psychologically. Individuals are loyal to "their" group (whatever that may
be), not the state. As members of traditional communities, people are tied into a
network of social relations and a web of mutual obligations, and these obligations
are much more powerful than obligations as a "citizen."
(emphasis added).
24. See Pimentel, Rule of Law Reform Without Cultural Imperialism, supra note 7, at 15.
25. See description of community courts infra Part VI.A.
26. OPEN SOC'Y INITIATIVE OF S. AFR., supra note 19, at 38.
27. Id. at 4. Noting:
These courts. . . are the most widespread officially recognised judicial fora
in Mozambique, with more than 1,500 reportedly in existence. Although
the 1992 Community Courts Law (Lei dos Tribunais Comunitirios) provided
the legal framework for community courts, with jurisdiction to deal with
minor civil and criminal disputes, they have no formal links with the
judicial courts, and, in practice, have received no financial or material help
from the government or judicial courts.
28. See Pimentel, Rule of Law Reform Without Cultural Imperialism, supra note 7, at 28.
Observing:
In Southern Sudan, these principles combined to suggest that the
customary courts must be retained with any reforms built on such
retention. Customary law mechanisms have deep cultural and historical
roots and are effective in maintaining a sense of order, stability, and
continuity in tribal society. Public confidence in them is high, higher than
it would be in any newly-imposed statutory court. And given the
enormous population to be served and the dearth of judges qualified to
adjudicate in statutory courts, Southern Sudan lacks the resources to
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linkages are ultimately established to implement legal pluralism should be
designed with the rule of law in mind.
B. Legal Pluralism and Respect for Indigenous Culture
One of the most compelling reasons to embrace and pursue legal
pluralism in the post-colonial state is to preserve and respect the cultural
tradition of indigenous peoples. Historically, the traditional culture of the
colonized state has been devalued while foreign models of governance and
justice have been imposed. 29 This happens even today in the context of
"rule of law reform" efforts, funded by Western nations and the World
Bank. Rosa Brooks characterized it as "The New Imperialism," noting that
"[it should go without saying that the project of intervening in 'other'
cultures in order to change and 'improve' them is a fundamentally arrogant
and imperialist project, with many pitfalls."30
Nonetheless, since the demise of colonialism, and probably in reaction
to it, sensibilities are far more respectful of indigenous culture and the
institutions that reflect it. Hence, many constitutions in post-colonial Africa
explicitly recognize the legitimacy of customary law, and some go so far as
to exempt applications of customary law from their constitutions' anti-
discrimination provisions.31  There is a grave risk, however, that as
developing nations are attempting to bring their legal systems into
conformity with prevailing international standards, traditional cultural
values will be a casualty of that effort.32 The communities that still govern
themselves by such principles - often the poorest and most remote in an
replace the customary courts with any alternative system.
29. Even in the United States, the treatment of tribal court jurisdiction in indigenous
Native American communities has followed this pattern. A key example is the prosecution of
Crow Dog in federal courts after the tribal courts had already resolved the matter under Sioux
tribal law. When the U.S. Supreme Court overturned Crow Dog's conviction, Congress
reacted by passing legislation to restrict tribal court jurisdiction, and ensure that all "major
crimes" would henceforth be handled in federal court, and not in the tribal communities.
David Pimentel, Can Indigenous Justice Survive?: Legal Pluralism and the Rule of Law, 32 HARV.
INT'L REV. 32 (2010) [hereinafter Pimentel, Can Indigenous Justice Survive?: Legal Pluralism and
the Rule of Law]. Within the last 35 years, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued new decisions,
further restricting the authority of tribal courts. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquanish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191 (1978) (tribal courts have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians); Duro v.
Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (tribal courts have no jurisdiction over Indians of another tribe); see
also infra note 113.
30. Rosa Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the "Rule Of Law," 101 MICH. L.
REV. 2275 (2003) (detailing rule of law reform failures in Kosovo, Rwanda, and elsewhere,
based on ignorance of local cultural norms, and overestimating the role of "law" in the rule of
law).
31. Bond, supra note 14, at 290.
32. Pimentel, Rule of Law Reform Without Cultural Imperialism, supra note 7, at 4. Noting:
[Any attempt to export concepts of institutional justice from Western
powers - particularly those countries that dominate the UN power
structure - can be characterized as a type of cultural imperialism, a
particularly sensitive issue in post-colonial societies. The checkered
history of Western powers' attempts to 'civilize the savages' around the
world and across the centuries should make us all uncomfortable with any
exercise of cultural imperialism.
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economically aspiring state - may be victimized in the process as their way
of life is jeopardized.
Accordingly, legal pluralism can be an effective means of preserving
and respecting cherished cultural values and the societies that live by them.
The linkages established to implement the pluralistic system should be
crafted to serve and support these objectives.
C. Legal Pluralism and Politics
For many centuries, legal pluralism has been fostered and exploited for
political advantage. It is an old dynamic, dating back at least as far as the
Roman Empire, which occupied much of Northern Africa; indeed, it is
clearly depicted in Biblical accounts of the Roman occupation of Israel. 33
Kyed states it succinctly: "State recognition of non-state legal orders is ...
not a technical, neutral process, but an inherently political one. The state
legitimises the authority of non-state justice providers, but also assumes the
authority to define what counts as legitimate non-state justice institutions
and rules." 34
Colonial regimes allowed local law and traditional legal institutions to
persist under their rule, as a means of "managing" local society.35
Describing British policy in Kenya, one commentator observed:
The recognition of African Customary Law was paramount to the
colonial enterprise. With limited resources and incongruent policy
objectives, it was highly unlikely that the governance of the colony
could be achieved without the help of the indigenous communities.
Moreover, implementation of the principles of indirect rule
necessitated the maintenance of traditional rules and regulation so
33. While the Bible is not primarily a historical or political text, it presents an example, as
compelling as it is ancient, of the legal pluralism at play in the Roman occupation. The
account of the judgment and condemnation of Jesus involved accusation before a Jewish body
- the Sanhedrin - and the transfer of jurisdiction to the Roman authority, Pontius Pilate, who
had exclusive power to approve the infliction of capital punishment:
Pilate then went out unto them, and said, "What accusation bring ye
against this man?" They [the Jews] answered and said unto him, "If he
were not a malefactor, we would not have delivered him up unto thee."
Then said Pilate unto them, "Take ye him, and judge him according to
your law." The Jews therefore said unto him, "It is not lawful for us to put
any man to death."
John 18:29-31 (King James). The Roman preference to have locals judged according to local law
is evident here, as is the Roman reservation of ultimate authority, that of execution, exclusively
in themselves. Jesus was ultimately executed under Roman authority, by crucifixion, a Roman
means of execution; had the Jews carried out the penalty under Mosaic law, it would have
been done by stoning. JAMES E. TALMAGE, JESUS THE CHRIST 632 (1949).
34. Helene Maria Kyed, On the Politics of Legal Pluralism: The Case of Post-War Mozambique,
59 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 87,90 (2004).
35. De Sousa Santos, supra note 11, at 62-63 (In Mozambique, "traditional authorities
have been politicized or politically manipulated. This was also the case during the colonial
period . .. . The colonial use of traditional law and structures of power was thus an integral
part of the process of colonial domination obsessed with the reproduction of the super-
exploitation of African labor.").
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as to eliminate active dissent to the British occupation.36
The rtgulos system in Mozambique, for example, was an attempt by the
Portuguese to use traditional authority (autoridade gentilica) "to control and
tax the population."37 Co-opting local leaders was by far the easiest way to
assert colonial control.
In turn, local leaders were highly motivated to cooperate with the
colonizers, whose support would help consolidate the local leaders' own
power base.38 Thus the politics of the indigenous authorities played a large
role in the legal pluralism regime; the local leaders were exploiting
pluralism as much as the colonists were.
Even today, political parties have built alliances with non-state
authorities, pitching themselves as champions of traditional society and
cultural values. Again, in Mozambique we see this dynamic played out
fully. After independence, the new FRELIMO government attempted to
marginalize traditional leaders (by ignoring their authority) and replace
traditional law. 39 The opposition party, RENAMO, took up the cause,
promising rural communities the "recuperation of an insulted identity,"
and protection of their "traditional social and cultural norms." 40
While legal pluralism has been embraced by political operators to serve
their own interests, these motivations do not necessarily reflect the best
interest of post-colonial society.41 This observation functions mostly as a
caution, rather than a guiding principle. Linkages should be established
with an eye toward minimizing the potential for political manipulation and
exploitation of the legal pluralism regime.42 Although political influence
plays an important influence in state governance, judiciaries cannot play
their proper role in society if they are perceived as a tool for politics.
36. Laurence Juma, Reconciling African Customary Law and Human Rights in Kenya: Making
a Case for Institutional Reformation and Revitalization of Customary Adjudication Processes, 14 ST.
THOMAS L. REv. 459,478 (2002).
37. Ian Convery, Lifescapes & Governance: The Rtgulo System in Central Mozambique, 109
REV. OF AFR. POL. ECON. 449, 451 (2006) ("[AIII rdgulos had to enforce 'native policy' designed
to control peasant societies and extract surplus from them for the benefit of state or colonial
companies.").
38. Bond, supra note 14, at 299 ("Indigenous male leaders . . . had an interest in
establishing a source of authority, particularly in light of colonial oppression. The colonizers,
in turn, had an interest in pleasing indigenous male leaders whose labor and cooperation was
needed for effective colonial administration and economic development." (citation omitted)).
39. Convery, supra note 37, at 452.
40. Id.
41. See infra notes 64-65, discussing Local Government Act in Southern Sudan. There, the
people are objecting to how the implementation of legal pluralism has resulted in political
manipulation of the customary regime.
42. Of course, any country's legal and governmental institutions are a product of its
politics, and one cannot expect customary law and statutory structures to be linked in a
political vacuum. On the other hand, politicization of judicial institutions is particularly
troublesome, as it is fundamentally at odds with the independence and impartiality we
demand of judicial officers and judicial institutions.
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D. Legal Pluralism and Human Rights
Another major theme in the legal pluralism universe is human rights.
Human rights advocates complain that legal pluralism inherently
compromises human rights, particularly those of women. 43 Their concern is
that it often perpetuates and strengthens traditional patriarchal regimes
that systematically undervalue women's rights and interests.44
This is a compelling issue, one that demands attention in any
discussion of legal pluralism. Where traditional and customary law, by
their very precepts, undervalue the rights and dignity of women, children,
ethnic minorities, religious minorities, or even political minorities, it is
important that the legal pluralism regime account and control for that
effect.
The conflict over human rights in this context is complex, pitting the
collective right of a community to draw on its own cultural values, and to
apply its own customary law, against the rights of the individual within
that group who may suffer under the traditional regime. If justice is to be
done in a pluralistic legal system, there should be some limits to the respect
for and deference to indigenous culture.45 Anthropologists blanch at this
suggestion, as passing a moral judgment about what should be changed in
a local culture violates core values of anthropological ethics.46
Yet customary law has proven to be a battleground for human rights
activists. These activists see customary law as an obstacle to recognition of
the rights of those who have been historically disenfranchised. Most often,
these arguments arise over women's rights to land, to inheritance, and to
equal treatment. But the application of customary law can also do
tremendous violence to others who lack power or authority under the
traditional regime. In Sudan, for example, the rights and dignity of
children and families have been compromised by the customary practice of
awarding, as compensation in legal disputes, one of the defendant's
daughters to the plaintiff/victim. 47 Similarly, it is common that a tribal
43. Bond, supra note 14, at 289 ("Multiculturalism has long been considered inimical to
gender equality.").
44. Id.
45. Pimentel, Rule of Law Reform Without Cultural Imperialism, supra note 7, at 7-8.
Arguing:
One may not excuse wholesale human rights violations, extreme examples
of which might include slavery and human sacrifice, even if these practices
were defining elements of an indigenous society's local culture. If ethnic
or religious minorities, or women, or children, or political prisoners are
being victimized by injustice in a society, it is neither respectful nor
defensible to look the other way in the name of cultural sensitivity.
Tolerance of cultural differences need not, and must not, require the
acceptance of practices that violate the most fundamental principles of
human rights and dignity.
46. George P. Castile, An Unethical Ethic: Self-Determination and the Anthropological
Conscience, 34 HUM. ORG. 35 (1975) (arguing that anthropologists should never make ethical
judgments based on ethnocentric or subjective morality).
47. Pimentel, Rule of Law Reform Without Cultural Imperialism, supra note 7, at 18.
Observing:
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community's customary law will favor members of that tribe,
discriminating against or wholly disregarding the rights of those outside
the tribal community.48
Cultural sensitivity and respect for local custom cannot justify
wholesale rights violations like this. Legal pluralism cannot be used as an
excuse to disregard the rights and dignity of individuals victimized by the
traditional regime.
Moreover, as Johanna Bond has eloquently explained, the customary
law that has been used for the continued subjugation of women in African
post-colonial society is not necessarily a pure reflection of traditional
culture.49 Customary law is irretrievably tainted by colonial rule, which
reinforced gender distinctions consistent with the European values the
colonizers brought with them. The influence of the colonial regime,
therefore, interfered with women's ability to advocate for themselves within
their traditional society.50 Most cultures and legal systems in the world -
with the possible exception of those most heavily steeped in religion - have
gravitated, over the last 100 years, towards greater recognition of women's
rights and interests.5 1 African customary law is likely to evolve that same
direction if women are allowed to advocate for themselves within that
[DJue to the long-standing cultural practice of "'bride 'wealth" - a custom
by which a young man wishing to marry must present the bride's family
with a bride price - an unmarried girl has significant economic value in
certain local communities. For many families in this incredibly
impoverished region, their daughters are their only significant assets, as
each carries the promise of future bride wealth and a means of social
security for the family. When a tort claim such as wrongful death arises
between two families, the tortfeasor may have nothing to compensate the
plaintiff with other than his own daughter. Recognizing this, customary
courts in Southern Sudan have historically resorted to this as a remedy:
ordering one family to compensate the other by giving them one of their
daughters. It is, of course, impossible to reconcile this legal and cultural
practice with contemporary standards of human rights. Nonetheless, it is a
practice deeply rooted in Southern Sudanese society.
(citations omitted).
48. See, e.g., Ana Natividad Martinez, Intertribal Conflicts and Customary Law Regimes in
North Africa: A Comparison of Haratin and Ait 'Atta Indigenous Legal Systems, 5 TRIBAL L.J. 1
(2005), http://tlj.unm.edu/tribal-law-journal/articles/volume-5/intertribal-conflictsand
customary_1awsregimes in-northafricaa comparison-of-haratin and-ait-atta indigenous
legal-systems/index.php (last visited Apr. 18, 2011) (In Morocco, "[t]he Ait 'Atta divided land
and water among their lineages . . . , adhering to their organizational principle of excluding
strangers or non-members from these benefits.").
49. Bond, supra note 14, at 297-98.
50. See also Castile, supra note 46 (arguing that the preservation of variation in plural
societies as a step toward increasing evolutionary potential through a model of incorporative
change has the special virtue of placing moral decision-making as to the nature of change in
the hands of those who are to undergo the change).
51. For example, over 185 nations in the world, representing a wide range of cultures, are
now parties to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW). Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Opened For Signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14. Those missing from the list
include prominent Islamic states, such as Iran, Somalia, and Sudan. The United States is also
one of the few states that has not ratified CEDAW, but even there, from suffrage to Title VII to
Title LX, there have been enormous advances in the protection of the rights of women.
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culture. Colonialism, however, impaired their ability to do so, and some
versions of legal pluralism, which view traditional customary law as
something static that must be preserved in present (or ancient) form, would
have the effect of perpetuating these inequalities.5 2
In fact, customary law is not fixed or static, and should not be treated
that way by those attempting to implement a system of legal pluralism.
The oral tradition typical of customary law is marked for its flexibility and
adaptability; it can evolve to embrace a stronger recognition of the rights of
women. This aspect of customary law was noted in an oft-cited Kenyan
case over forty-five years ago:
A characteristic feature of native law is flexibility. In its contact with
European civilization, foreign concepts may creep into the native
customary law and influence it without necessarily depriving it of
its essential character of custom. A customary law that once
prevailed may now exist in a modified form owing to modern
political, social and economic developments. The new or modified
custom may be deemed to have acquired the force of law if it is
shown that the members of the community recognize it as an
obligatory rule which regulates the conduct of persons within that
community.53
Accordingly, it is important to remember that respect for customary
law includes respect for its ability to evolve, and that human rights may be
best protected if the legal pluralism regime allows customary law to do
precisely that.54
Legal pluralism, therefore, has the potential to either strengthen human
rights protections or wholly undermine them, depending on how it is
implemented. The human rights interest should accordingly be given
particular attention and priority when framing and implementing linkages.
E. Legal Pluralism and Economic Development
Promoting economic development is another interest served in the
implementation of legal pluralism. This is a strong theme, especially in the
wake of the collapse of socialist ideology in the post-colonial state. The
"Washington Consensus" of the mid-1980s, embraced by both the IMF and
the World Bank, acknowledged that the best hope to improve the lot of
developing nations came in diminishing state power over the national
52. See Bond, supra note 14, at 297-98.
53. Kabaka's Gov't v. Kitono, (1965) 1965 E.A.L.R. 278, 285 (Kenya) (a Kenyan case
quoted in Juma, supra note 36, at 481).
54. See Raquel Yrigoyen Fajardo, Legal Pluralism, Indigenous Law and the Special Jurisdiction
in the Andean Countries, 27 BEYOND LAW 32, 36-37 (2004) ("It is important to realize that
indigenous peoples and cultures are not static, even though conceptions of them tend to be.
Cultures and forms of social organization are constantly transforming and re-creating
themselves."), available at http:/ /www.themastering.com/ www edit/upload/cades/courses/
050301/RYF-legalPluralism-BeyondLaw27-5.pdf (last visited June 14, 2010).
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economy, in favor of deregulation and privatization.55 But the World Bank
also recognized, by the mid-1990s, that this new development model
"presupposed a state strong and efficient enough to ensure an effective
regulation of the economy and the stability of the expectations of economic
agents and social actors in general." 56
The demise of the socialist state resulted in a radical reordering of
power, including "the reemergence of traditional authorities as a social and
political actor."5 7 The problem with the emerging pluralism is the
unresolved question as to whether the legal order it has produced is
sufficiently sound, stable, and predictable to invite investment and sustain
development.
Consequently, the economic development needs of the nation need to
be taken into account in establishing the role of customary dispute
resolution fora, and in any system of linkages adopted. The ability to
sustain life - jobs and livelihood - is a far more immediate need, at least in
the Maslovian sense, than the less tangible promise of access to culturally-
meaningful justice. Legal pluralism cannot be allowed to sacrifice the
former for the latter.
III. THE How OF LEGAL PLURALISM
An unanswered question for Mozambique, and for many of the
countries that have officially recognized their pluralistic status, is how the
non-state and state institutions should be connected. There is no obvious
answer to this question, as any system of linkages brings its own set of
problems and difficulties.
The optimal structural approach undoubtedly depends on what one is
trying to accomplish. Colonists used legal pluralism as a means of keeping
the indigenous peoples in check. Modern political leaders, including elites
within the indigenous society, may use it as a political tool to consolidate
their own power and influence. Religious groups may rely upon it in an
effort to perpetuate practices affecting women, even when such practices
violate generally recognized human rights norms.
The recommended approach for Mozambique should be driven by
higher principles and purposes, and by the desire to avoid the exploitation
of legal pluralism for purposes of oppression, or political or personal gain.
Accordingly, the linkages should be established in a way that (1) recognizes
and respects traditional culture and custom, (2) limits the potential for such
traditions to violate the fundamental human rights of women, ethnic or
political minorities, or other persons or groups, and (3) fosters the
establishment of the rule of law.58
Obviously, some of these ideals are at cross-purposes. If the traditional
55. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, supra note 11, at 43.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 44 (explaining that this phenomenon occurred in Mozambique).
58. This third element should serve to support the economic development interests,
discussed supra, as well.
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values and customary law do not accord inheritance rights to women, then
the respect of the tradition comes at the expense of the human rights of
women. If the state courts have power to strike down this discriminatory
provision of customary law, then the legal pluralism regime is failing to
respect traditional culture and custom, at least to the extent that such
tradition includes the marginalization of women.
So the appropriate mechanism for implementing legal pluralism
involves some necessary balancing and trade-offs, to ensure that justice is
done (both from a human rights and a rule of law perspective), while being
as respectful as otherwise possible of traditional culture and institutions.
While human rights are of the greatest importance, disrupting local culture
unnecessarily will undermine peace and stability, including the rule of law,
in the affected society. The welfare and dignity of the society and of the
individuals in it demand a more nuanced approach.
Below, we will consider different conceptual approaches, grouped in
three general categories: (1) the colonial approach, (2) the superior state
approach, and (3) the equal dignity approach.
A. The Colonial Approach
Although colonialism has been thoroughly discredited today,
colonialism's approach to legal pluralism reflected this concept of
balancing. The British colonists, for example, took an approach to legal
pluralism that assumed the validity of local customary law and the
authority of traditional leaders to administer it. To avoid offensive
outcomes under the traditional regime, however, they relied on
"repugnancy clauses," which allowed a British Magistrate's court to
overrule customary laws or the local authorities' judgments if they were
"repugnant to justice and morality."5 9
The repugnancy clauses are notorious today because they reflect an
assumption of cultural superiority. What is repugnant to English
sensibilities is largely a product of English culture, and if customary law is
to be struck down on that basis, the sole rationale is the assumed
superiority of English ethics and morality. Coming from the other
direction, certainly some aspects of European culture were repugnant to
indigenous society,60 but the repugnancy clauses worked only in one
59. Juma, supra note 36, at 477-78 (Appeals from the native tribunals "lay to the
Magistrate's court" which, in turn, could be "'guided' by customary law in cases where the
parties were natives... only in so far as the same was not 'repugnant to justice and morality,'
or inconsistent with any written law," (citation omitted)). See also LEILA CHIRAYATH iET AL.,
CUSTOMARY LAW AND POLicY REFORM: ENGAGING WITH THE PLURALITY OF JUSTICE SYSTEMS, 8-9
(2005), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2006/Resources/47
7 383-
1118673432908/CustomaryLaw andPolicyReform.pdf (last visited June 2, 2011) ("Most
colonial regimes introduced colonial repugnancy clauses thereby recognizing customary law
only to the extent that it conformed to European legal norms.").
60. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 66 (3d ed. 2007) (The
indigenous people of the North American Great Lakes region "were repelled by French
practices, notably prohibition of divorce, corporal punishment of children, and prudish
attitudes toward the human body." (citation omitted)).
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direction.
Another aspect of colonial pluralism that appears offensive from
today's perspective is the role colonizers played in empowering some
traditional leaders and disempowering others. While the official policy of
the British, for example, was to defer to the non-repugnant judgments of
traditional leaders - e.g., tribal chiefs administering customary law - it was
the colonial authority that decided who was recognized as such a leader.61
Traditional authorities who resisted colonial rule were ignored, or forced
from positions of influence, as colonialism strengthened those traditional
leaders who collaborated with the occupying force. Here is a prime
example of how legal pluralism was exploited on all sides for political
advantage: (1) colonial authorities benefitted by using formal recognition of
local authorities as a means of securing local leaders' support and loyalty,
and (2) the cooperating traditional leaders benefitted, by using the support
they enjoyed from the colonial occupiers to consolidate their own power.62
While some aspects of the colonial approach were positive - such as the
presumption that customary law should apply (subject only to certain
limits) - no one is advocating a return to colonialism. The conceptual
foundations of the colonial approach, which might be characterized as
condescending exploitation, are deeply offensive to modern sensibilities.
At the same time, we should be careful to learn what we can from the
experience of colonialism, both positive and negative, and we should be
careful not to adopt or endorse a regime that reflects the flaws, or repeats
the mistakes, noted above.
As an example, the newly-formed government of Southern Sudan
appears to be, in one respect at least, replicating the colonial dynamic. It
has recognized the legitimacy of customary law and customary courts
under its interim constitution.63  But the recently passed "Local
Government Act" provides that chieftainships - presumably those
empowered to administer customary law - will be established by popular
elections, not according to traditional legitimacy.64 It is not clear yet to
61. Manfred 0. Hinz, Customary Law in Southern Sudan: A Strategy to Strengthen Southern
Sudanese Customary Law as a Source of Law in an Autonomous Legal System, 1 294, at 104 (2010)
(" [The colonial administration created agents, called chiefs, who, on the one side, were
reliable in terms of colonial interests, but, on the other side, also needed to be respected by the
communities as leaders.").
62. Bond, supra note 14 at 299; see passage quoted supra note 38.
63. "The ICSS [Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan] also guarantees a role for traditional
authorities and recognises customary laws regarding community land tenure. Articles 174 and 175
guarantee respect for the 'institution, status and role of traditional authority,' and call upon
Southern courts to apply customary law." (emphasis added) VANESSA JIMENEZ & TIM MURITI,
CENTRE FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, SOUTH SUDAN WITHIN A NEW SUDAN 26 (April 2006),
available at http:/ / www.ccr.org.za/images/stories/pdfs/Vol 13-SudanFinal_211106.pdf.
64. Local Government Act of 2009, § 117 (S. Sudan). Hinz observes that:
The Local Government Act obviously intends to ignore the chiefs system
in place in the sense that the act will call for elections at the various levels
of what the act calls chiettainships, elections, which might result in the re-
election of incumbent office holders, but also in the out-voting at least of
those who will lose as the new structure will only accommodate leaders
elected in accordance with the envisaged one-dimensional pyramidal
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what degree this will politicize the selection of chiefs, or to what degree the
dominant party, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), will
attempt to influence such local elections, but the community appears
resistant to this re-definition and reallocation of traditional authority.65
Thus, as in the colonial state, traditional authority is preserved in name, but
it is reinvented to reflect the interests of the modern state. There is
considerable risk that the party in power - which passed the Local
Government Act - will be able to influence these local elections, thereby
shoring up its political base. At the same time, chiefs and other customary
law adjudicators may learn that they can strengthen their own standing and
authority by offering their allegiance to, and securing the endorsement of,
the party in power.
B. The Superior State Approach
The colonial approach was built on the premise that the colonial power
retained ultimate authority; local authorities could govern only to the
extent that the colonial regime chose to allow. 66 Any serious conflict with
the colonial power was certain to result in restriction of local authority.
Now that the colonial regimes have, for the most part, folded up their
tents and gone home, the governments of newly-independent states are
assuming the role of ultimate authority. Many of their constitutions
recognize the validity of customary law and of customary courts - non-
state institutions - but the superiority of the state institutions is assumed.
The result is a superior state approach to legal pluralism, in which state
institutions always trump the customary ones, often through the power of
appellate review.67
system of local cum traditional authority.
Hinz, supra note 61, 11 299, at 105.
65. Hinz, supra note 61, 11 302, at 106 ("[At a community meeting] the majority... refused
to accept such elections. The majority opted for the system in place, according to which chiefs
come from one family and the position of chiefs is in so far hereditary.").
66. See, e.g., TOYIN FALOLA & MATTHEW M. HEATON, A HISTORY OF NIGERIA 7 (2008)
("[I]n all cases they [the British] took away the sovereignty that local rulers had enjoyed
previously. If an 'indirect ruler' displeased the British, he would not be the local authority for
long, regardless of the 'traditional' basis of his authority."); see also Susan Elizabeth Ramirez,
Colonialism Latin America Bibliography, JRANK SCIENCE ENCY.
http://science.jrank.org/pages/7571/Colonialism-Latin-America.html (last visited February
2011) ("Colonialism is all about the exercise of power and its consequences.... The imposition
of one state's will over another is the essence of colonialism.").
67. See generally Brynna Connolly, Non-State Justice Systems and the State: Proposals for a
Recognition Typology, 38 CONN. L. REV. 239 (2005). Connolly breaks down a state's approach to
customary law into four categories: (1) abolition, (2) full incorporation (where the state law
formally adopts customary law), (3) limited incorporation (where customary law is permitted
to continue as a separate legal regime, subject to the state's authority), and (4) no incorporation
(where the legal regimes remain entirely separate). The first two categories of Connolly's
typology are not instances of legal pluralism, as a singular legal regime prevails under both
systems, although the latter attempts to adopt customary law principles in the new system.
Legal pluralism plays out primarily if not exclusively under the "limited incorporation"
model. The colonial approach and the superior state approach are both examples of this.
Connolly's fourth category, "no incorporation," is largely hypothetical, because it is practically
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In extreme cases, the result may be virtually indistinguishable from the
Colonial Approach, as the state retains ultimate authority. 68
A key difference, however, is that the colonial power was always an
outsider. It was rarely interested in completely incorporating local society.
Colonists were content to exploit local resources and imposed their own
law and their own regime only to the extent necessary to do that. Once a
former colony achieves independence, however, the new state is highly
motivated to assert a unified national identity. Accordingly, the newly-
independent state will naturally gravitate toward the superior state
approach, asserting that the state can be a proper guardian of local culture
in a way the colonial power never could. The practical application of the
impossible for the systems to remain entirely separate; they will inevitably come into contact
and conflict with each other. Even in Native American communities of the United States,
Connolly's example of "no incorporation," federal courts assert jurisdiction over major crimes.
See Pimentel, supra note 29, at 1 (discussing how federal authorities intervened in Ex Parte
Crow Dog when tribal justice was deemed inadequate). The equal dignity approach
theoretically tracks Connolly's "no incorporation" model, but in practice requires some limited
linkages. See infra Part IlI.F (explaining that the equal dignity approach, strictly applied, may
leave certain human rights abuses unremedied and unremediable).
68. Sanele Sibanda argues that this is happening in South Africa currently. Sanele
Sibanda, When Is the Past Not the Past? Reflections on Customary Law Under South Africa's
Constitutional Dispensation, 17 NO. 3 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 31 (2010) ("[S]inilar to other post-
independence states, South Africa has engaged in extensive judicial and legislative customary
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Superior State Approach, therefore, may include attempts to codify
customary law into state law and to assert the primacy of statutory courts
over customary adjudication.
1. Written Law Versus Unwritten Law
The Superior State Approach will inevitably create pressure to reduce
the customary law to writing. Formal codification has obvious appeal to
Western interests - the World Bank, foreign rule of law reformers, etc. -
whose own legal traditions are deeply rooted in the interpretation and
application of written codes and decisions. There are other advantages to
codification as well, including that it provides a means of addressing
human rights issues. To the extent that certain principles of customary law
are offensive to constitutional and human rights norms, those provisions
can be formally excised from a written code. As long as the law remains
unwritten, preserved and applied solely by oral tradition, the human rights
problems are difficult to isolate and resolve.
Written law may be necessary as well if statutory courts are to exercise
appellate jurisdiction over customary court decisions. If the appellate court
is not privy to the customary law, it has no adequate basis for reconsidering
the rulings of a traditional authority. Left to guess at the legal principles
applied by a chief in a rural community and without a full understanding
of customary law or the social milieu in which it operates, the statutory
court is likely to get it wrong. Accordingly, codification may be a necessary
precursor to meaningful appellate review.
Codification, however, brings other costs to the system and to the
concept of legal pluralism, and should not be pursued without at least
considering the compelling advantages of an oral legal tradition. First, oral
law is flexible and highly adaptable;69 this is one of its greatest strengths!70
It responds to shifting priorities and exigencies in its society in ways that
written law never can.71 Written law is frozen in time, reflecting the issues
and concerns that were present at the time the law was adopted. Courts
struggle continually with the problem of how to apply old law (including
constitutional language), born of obsolete concerns, that no longer reflects
69. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Paratexts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 509, 519 ("[Q1ral
traditions were far less likely to be rigid or 'dead letter' than later handwritten and
typographic law would be. While oral culture had formalistic and exclusionary qualities,
adaptability was its dominant feature. The fact that customs had to be recalled and repeated,
rather than recorded and read, made them relatively malleable." (citations omitted).
70. Juma, supra note 36 at 481. See also Raja Devasish Roy, Challenges for Juridical Pluralism
and Customary Laws of Indigenous Peoples: The Case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, 21
ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 113, 143 (2004) ("Customary law based upon oral traditions has the
advantage of flexibility, in that local communities may craft their unique multi-dimensional
approaches in dealing with personal law disputes and provide remedies to fit the situation.").
71. EWA WOJKOWSKA, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, DOiNG JUSTICE: How INFORMAL JUSTICE
SYSTEMS CAN CONTRIUTE 26 (2006) ("Codification is an oft debated subject. Customary law is
often defined by its fluidity. This allows customary law to change with the community. The
codification process would freeze the laws in place and may not allow them to develop and
change over time.").
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the needs or priorities of contemporary society. 72 Oral traditions, in
contrast, evolve naturally and almost effortlessly to accommodate societal
changes.
Second, oral traditions tend to be more fully understood and embraced
by the community. Because the law is recorded only in memory, it must be
fully internalized by those who will apply it, and it is therefore likely to be
more wholly internalized by the community as a whole.7 3  Public
acceptance of and public confidence in legal rules and institutions are vital
to the establishment of the rule of law.74 Citizens will abide by such laws
and heed such institutions when they know, understand, and collectively
embrace them.75
Moreover, codification delivers far less than it promises. First, when a
statutory court attempts to apply customary law based on a codification or
ascertainment, it suffers from the problem of recursive translations: from
practice to writing, and from writing back to practice. In other words, it is
unlikely that the nuances of the oral tradition can be fully captured in
writing in the first place, including the role of equity in accounting for all
surrounding circumstances. And when that writing is later interpreted and
applied, especially by a statutory court unfamiliar with the particular
culture and community from which the oral tradition emerged, something
more is likely to be lost. Thus, even with the benefit of a written version of
the customary law, the statutory court is likely to get it wrong.
A compelling example is the S.M. Otieno case in Kenya. In this case a
statutory court was asked to determine whether state law or customary law
of the Luo community applied to the decision as to where a deceased
would be buried.76 The deceased's widow - wanting to bury her husband
in Nairobi - asserted rights in a statutory court, but the deceased's other
relatives, representing the Luo clan, insisted that because the deceased was
a Luo, he should be buried according to Luo custom, i.e., in the ancestral
home. The court of appeals decision ultimately vindicated the customary
law, and the case has been cited as an example of the continued vitality of
customary law despite the intrusion of statutory regimes. As Juma points
out, however, the case was a "missed opportunity":
72. Adrian Vermeule & Eric Posner, Outcomes, Outcomes, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 12,
2009, http://www.tnr.com/article/books/outcomes-outcomes (last visited June 3, 2011)
(noting the difficulty in reconciling application of the original language and intent of the U.S.
Constitution with "the raw fact that large chunks of the original constitutional order are, from
the standpoint of the present, normatively horrifying, economically obsolete, or politically
unacceptable to supermajorities of the current citizenry.").
73. Roy, supra note 70 at 143 ("As is the general trend with customary laws worldwide,
practices and usages change as more and more people indulge in, get used to, and accept new
ways of doing things. The creation of a walking path through a grassy field or woods is one of
the best metaphors describing how customs originate or change.").
74. See STROMSETH et al., supra note 18, at 75-76.
75. Id. at 76 (" Without a widely shared cultural commitment to the idea of the rule of law,
courts are just buildings, judges are just bureaucrats, and constitutions are just pieces of
paper.").
76. The case is summarized nicely in Juma, supra note 36, at 484.
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[T]he widow's case should have rested, not in denying customary
law, but on asserting that those customs could allow for burial in
places other than one's ancestral home . . . . [T]he clan lawyer
failed to present current evidence on the current position of Luo
Customary Law, thereby portraying Luo Customary Law as
"timeless essences called from the pre-colonial past." . . . [Tihe
accuracy of Luo customs, as presented by the clan, was taken as
absolute truth.7 7
Had the Luo customary law been codified, the statutory court could have
relied upon that code and might have avoided a misapplication of the
controlling principle. On the other hand, reliance on a codification done in
the past will similarly fail to capture "the current position of . . . Customary
Law," and will tie its application to some timeless, but never timely, written
characterization of it.7
2. Ownership of Customary Law
With or without codification, there are serious problems with giving
statutory courts appellate jurisdiction over customary courts. As already
noted, there is a serious likelihood that the statutory court will get it wrong.
But even if the statutory court gets the customary law right, the customary
law institution is irreparably harmed by the assertion of statutory court
authority over the legal question. Once a statutory court - in an exercise of
appellate review - has ruled on what customary law means, the traditional
authority, representing the community itself, loses ownership of its
customary law.
The statutory court decision typically becomes a matter of public record
and may be cited as precedent. In a common law jurisdiction such as
Kenya or Uganda, the court's decision actually becomes law. At that point,
the customary court and the community cease to be the owner and
guardian of such law. Future statutory courts will look to the precedent,
with little regard for what the original customary law may have been or
how the customary law may have evolved since. The customary law is no
longer customary, no longer a reflection of the community's norms and
values, but a law defined and imposed by an external authority: the
statutory court.
The problem is even worse if the customary law is codified, because
then only the legislature can amend it. In that event, the community is
entirely deprived of "its" law and subject to a statutory regime which,
although originally inspired by its own oral tradition, is now imposed on
77. Juma, supra note 36, at 484-85 (citation omitted).
78. The real problem here came with the idea of expecting a statutory court to interpret
and apply customary law at all. As argued infra in Part IV.D.2, the linkages should be
established to ensure that statutory courts are never called upon to interpret or apply
customary law.
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the community by external authorities.79
Recognizing the problems with codification for use in appellate review,
some have advocated the less intrusive exercise of "ascertainment," that is,
a recording of customary law that is merely descriptive and not
authoritative.8 0 But this is a minor concession to the problems inherent in
codification; ascertainments will still embolden statutory courts to second-
guess customary ones, and with no greater likelihood of faithfulness to the
underlying principles and policies of customary law. Moreover,
ascertainments will not amend themselves to reflect the ever-changing
norms and customs, and may therefore be quickly rendered obsolete.
Ironically, the ascertainment may impede the natural and salutary
evolution of customary law toward greater recognition of women's rights
and other human rights, because the older values and principles are
ossified in written form.
3. Demeaning and Devaluing Customary Law Institutions
Quite aside from what happens to a case, and to the law, when it is
appealed, the very structure of appeals formally and officially asserts state
dominance over customary law and non-state institutions. This feature of
the Superior State Approach inevitably undermines the dignity that many
of these institutions deserve, simultaneously depriving them of their
relevance in the communities they serve.
Accordingly, the typical implementation of a Superior State Approach,
involving statutory appellate review of customary law decisions, and
possibly the codification or ascertainment of customary law to facilitate
such review, does incalculable damage to customary law and customary
law institutions. So handicapped, customary law cannot maintain its
vitality and relevance over time, and will simply be extinguished as the
statutory regime assumes control of all law.
This approach would be appropriate, perhaps, if legal pluralism were
envisioned as a temporary status to govern a state in transition. But where
the intent is to maintain and support a pluralistic regime over the long
term, the Superior State Approach is problematic. Customary law and
customary institutions need a stronger structural foundation if they are to
avoid obsolescence.
79. The S.M. Otieno case is an example of this. See supra note 76-78 and accompanying
text.
80. Manfred 0. Hinz, The Ascertainment of Customary Law: What Is It and What Is It For?
Conference Packet: Customary Justice & Legal Pluralism in Post-Conflict Societies 133, available
at http://www.usip.org/files/centers/.../Final%20Conference%20PacketlNPROL.doc (last
visited Apr. 12, 2010). The United States Institute of Peace has embarked upon projects to
ascertain customary law on the assumption that this is a better approach to the problems of
implementing legal pluralism. See, e g., U.S. Institute for Peace, Customary Law and Criminal
Justice in South Sudan, http://www.usip.org/programs/projects/customary-law-and-
criminal-justice-south-sudan (last visited June 2, 2010).
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C. The Equal Dignity Approach
To avoid the stigmatizing effect of the Superior State Approach - and
the violence that codification and appellate review do to customary law and
legal pluralism itself - the non-state, traditional authority requires
recognition separate from, and independent of, the state courts.
Empowering and dignifying customary law institutions in a robust
incarnation of legal pluralism requires that customary law, and the
institutions that apply it, enjoy a separate and equal dignity, or something











There are significant advantages to keeping the statutory and
customary systems separate. If customary courts remain the sole guardians
of customary law, the full benefit of the oral tradition can be retained. The
law will retain its flexibility and responsiveness to community needs.
Accordingly, customary law will continue to be a vital force in the
community as a reflection of its culture, and public confidence will be
preserved.
The primary difficulty with the Equal Dignity Approach is that
complete independence of customary courts will open the door to human
rights violations in those institutions. Traditional law and traditional
values, in many cultures, violate modern and otherwise widely-accepted
principles of gender equality and child protection. Application of such
customary laws will run afoul of guarantees included in the constitution as
well as the international human rights conventions and treaties the state has
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compliance, there has to be a way to ensure that customary courts comply
with basic principles of human rights. Unfortunately, any effort to do that
will necessarily compromise, to some degree, the concept of "equal
dignity."
Beside the human rights issue, the other problems with the Equal
Dignity Approach are not so much conceptual as practical. The
simultaneous co-existence of parallel but wholly independent systems
creates an opportunity for forum shopping, and introduces a range of
jurisdictional, "choice of law," and "conflict of law" issues that are difficult
to address.81 A preliminary discussion of such issues is set forth below in
Section V.
D. Reconciling the Approaches
Given both the advantages and disadvantages of each of these
approaches, it becomes apparent that the most productive approach may
involve a compromise between them. The result will be a system that
favors customary law, creating a presumption that customary law applies
wherever it can- "maximizing" customary law - and that limits review of
customary court decisions to the narrowly-tailored questions of human
rights and due process dictated by the constitution. It is impossible to set
forth all the mechanics here, or to resolve all the details of implementation,
but some larger principles can be articulated. These principles can serve as
useful guides in the establishment of linkages for an effective pluralism
regime.
1. "Maximizing" Customary Law
The natural tendency for statutory law to subsume and diminish
customary systems militates in favor of enhancing the role for customary
law and customary systems as much as possible. If the pluralism regime
contemplates a continuing and meaningful role for customary law, the
structure of the system must tip the scales heavily toward customary law to
resist the natural forces toward obsolescence that the Superior State
Approach would impose. This first principle may be referred to as
"maximization" of customary law. 82
There are compelling reasons for the "maximization" approach beyond
81. Choice of law is a problem under any system of legal pluralism. See Bond, supra note
14, at 301 ("The plural legal system established under colonial rule created difficult choice of
law questions.").
82. This "rule of maximization" was articulated by the Colombian Constitutional Court
in a 1997 decision on the rights of indigenous people and their claims to autonomy within the
Colombian state. Manuel Jos6 Cepeda-Espinosa, Judicial Activism in a Violent Context: The
Origin, Role and Impact of the Colombian Constitutional Court, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV.
529, 623-24 (2004), citing Decision T-523 of 1997, Carlos Gaviria Diaz, J. (unanimous), Francisco
Gembuel Pechene contra Gobernador del Cabildo Indigena de Jambal6 y Otros (Pechene v.
Governor of Cobildo Indigena de Jambalo et al.). Gearly the Colombian court recognizes the need
to strike a balance that favors empowering indigenous systems.
[Vol. 1482
Legal Pluralism in Post-Colonial Africa
the obvious one of demonstrating cultural sensitivity. In many post-
colonial states where legal pluralism is the norm, the traditional fora are the
most accessible, productive, and effective in meeting the dispute-resolution
needs of the population.8 3 If existing systems work, one should adhere to
the "do no harm" principle and hesitate to tamper with them.M Legal
institutions function within a delicate interplay of cultural values and
human expectations. Unnecessary meddling is likely to upset this balance
and harm, rather than strengthen, the rule of law.
2. Collateral Review in Lieu of Appeals
As already noted, the Superior State Approach does tremendous
violence to the customary law, depriving the community of its ownership
and control of such law, while depriving the law itself of its flexibility and
responsiveness to community needs. Even a system of appeals from
customary courts to statutory courts is likely to "do harm" in this way.85
But without appeals, how can the human rights violations so often
associated with customary justice be dealt with?
One approach is simply to trust the customary courts to do the right
thing, focusing on educating and training the customary court adjudicators.
After all, one of the strengths of the oral tradition is its flexibility and
adaptability. As soon as it is apparent that gender discrimination cannot be
tolerated in society, the customary law can certainly adapt itself to
accommodate the shift. But merely trusting and training is likely to fall
short of providing the protections needed. How many generations will it
take before customary courts become effective guardians of those rights?
Some minimally intrusive method for correcting human rights
violations is needed. Donovan and Assefa articulated the requirements
succinctly in their analysis of the issue as it relates to Ethiopia: "What is
needed in Ethiopia is a coherent, multi-faceted plan of state action designed
to support and preserve the existing customary law systems while
modifying them to eliminate the worst human rights abuses."8 6 Of course,
83. Minneh Kane et al., Reassessing Customary Law Systems as a Vehicle for Providing
Equitable Access to the Poor (World Bank "New Frontiers of Policy" Conference Paper, 2005)
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTRANETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/Kane.rev.pdf. Stating:
Customary Law systems . . . provide communities with a sense of
ownership, in contrast to formal legal systems that are perceived as alien
to a considerable number of people in Africa. Customary law tribunals are
inexpensive, accessible, and speedy. Their proceedings are easily
understood by users of the system. They are useful when the formal state
institutions are unable to reach the people, or where such institutions have
broken down or are affected by civil strife and conflict.
See also supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
84. This is the concept of primum non nocere ("First, do no harm") a core principle of
medical ethics derived from the Hippocratic Oath.
85. Id.
86. Dolores A. Donovan & Getachew Assefa, Homicide in Ethiopia: Human Rights,
Federalism, and Legal Pluralism, 51 AM. J. COM P. L. 505, 549 (2003).
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there is a conflict inherent in the attempt to "support and preserve"
customary law, while simultaneously "modifying" it.
The compromise lies in the concept of collateral review, rather than
appellate review. The specifics of collateral review procedure I have
recently summarized as follows:
Statutory courts can be vested with power to review and overturn
customary court decisions not on their merits, but rather on the
ground that the procedure, outcome, or remedy afforded by the
customary court somehow violated minimum standards of human
rights or judicial process guaranteed in the . . . Constitution. The
procedure leaves the customary court to determine what its law is
and how it should be applied, with the statutory court reviewing
those decisions only against these external standards.
United States federalism suggests an analogy. Federal courts will
not attempt to interpret state law but will defer to a state supreme
court on such questions, overturning a state court determination
(on, for example, a writ of habeas corpus) only if the state court
proceedings or decision violate rights under the federal laws or
Constitution. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Estelle
v. McGuire: "[It is not the province of a federal habeas court to
reexamine state court determinations on state law questions. In
conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding
whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States."
Similarly, statutory courts . . . can be empowered to review
customary court determinations, deferring entirely to the
customary court on issues of local law, but safeguarding the
minimum standards of justice and human rights. That is, the
statutory courts can be empowered to overturn a customary court
decision only to the extent it violates principles reflected in a
national constitution or in international human rights instruments
that the country has signed or ratified.8 7
87. Pimentel, Rule of Law Reform Without Cultural Imperialism, supra note 7, at 23-24 (citing
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 US 62, 68 (1991)).
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When the occasional case is overturned and remanded to the
customary law forum for reconsideration, the customary court has an
opportunity to internalize and adapt to the holding. Adaptation is easier
because customary law "is not written but is retained in the mind and
memory of a contemporary person, who attempts to apply it in the present-
day world, ideally bringing contemporary sensibilities and local wisdom to
the task." 88 It is unnecessary to reconcile evolving legal standards with
precedent or statute, as no such constraints are present in a customary law
regime. Customary law's "characteristic flexibility"89 was recognized in a
Nigerian case over 100 years ago:
"One of the most striking features of West African custom is its
flexibility; it appears to have been always subject to motives of
expediency, and it shows unquestionable adaptability to altered
circumstances without entirely losing its character." It should be
noted that eighty-two years later the oft-quoted dictum was again
quoted with approval by the Supreme Court [of Nigeria].90
The upshot is that one of customary law's defining characteristics and
strengths is its adaptability, and because it is adaptable, it should be able,
88. Pimentel, supra note 7, at 19 n.76.
89. Ehiribe, supra note 7, at 132.
90. Id. (quoting Lewis v. Bankole, [19091 1 NLR 100-101 (Nigeria); Agu v. Ikewibe, [19921
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relatively easily, to incorporate the newly articulated standards.9 ' This is
likely to be the least intrusive and most effective means of bringing
customary law into line with constitutional norms on human rights.
Following the "rule of maximization," the presumptions are against
interfering with customary law, with any such intervention narrowly
tailored. The approach of the Colombian Constitutional Court to the issue
is illustrative. In deciding whether to overturn a sentence of public
flogging, handed down by a traditional court,
[t]he [Constitutional] Court held that (i) whenever conflicts between
indigenous jurisdictions and other national interests arise, the
constitutional judge should apply the "Rule of maximization" of
indigenous autonomy; and (ii) the Rule requires acceptable
limitations of autonomy, which are the least restrictive available
alternatives. Indigenous peoples are thus limited in their use of
their autonomous jurisdictional powers by a standard of "minimum
inter-cultural consensus," which includes the right to life, the
prohibition of torture and slavery, and the application of cultural
procedural requirements. 92
In Mozambique, there are constitutional protections for human rights
that should be enforceable at every level in the country. 93 Respect for
indigenous systems cannot displace the constitutionally mandated respect
for human rights. In addition to the specific constitutional provisions,
Mozambique is signatory to a number of international human rights
instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
91. Kane et al., supra note 83 ("Customary Law systems . . . are flexible; they evolve as
communities evolve. . . ."). Bond observes that customary law was transformed by colonial
influence, including the general disenfranchisement of women. Bond, supra note 14, at 299
("[T]he colonial authorities allocated control over personal law to indigenous communities.
Personal law, however, was never truly free of British influence. It was this interaction
between traditional elites and colonial authorities that led to the distortion of custom and
customary law during the colonial period." (citation omitted)). If the customary law will
adapt negatively in response to colonial authority, it should certainly be capable of adapting to
conform more fully with international human rights norms.
92. Cepeda-Espinosa, supra note 82, at 624.
93. E.g. the Mozambican Constitution provides protections as follows:
Article 35: equal protection of law
Article 36: gender equality
Article 40: no "torture or ... cruel or inhuman treatment"
Article 47: child protection
Article 48: freedom of expression and information
Article 51: freedom of assembly and demonstration
Article 52: freedom of association
Article 54: freedom of conscience, religion, and worship
Article 55: freedom of residence and movement
Article 59: right to due process, presumption of innocence, no double jeopardy
Article 61: no ex post facto law
Article 62: right to counsel
Article 65: right to a public trial; nonadmissibility of coerced confessions.
CONST. OF THE REP. OF MOZAM. (2004).
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African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights, which are specifically
referenced in the constitution itself.94 Indeed, these international
instruments could be characterized as a reflection of this "minimum inter-
cultural consensus" mentioned by the Colombian Constitutional Court.9 5 It
should not be difficult, therefore, to determine what constitutes a sufficient
basis for overturning the decision of a traditional forum.
One example of the testing of customary law against constitutional
standards comes from the South African case of Bhe v. Magistrate,
Khayelitsha,96 which Bond discusses in some detail. 97 The question was
whether the customary law of intestate succession - male primogeniture, in
this community - violated the South African Constitution's gender equality
guarantees. The Court examined the application of the customary law and
noted that the oldest male heir no longer inherits, with the property, the
responsibility to provide for the widow and other children, who are often
left destitute as a result. Against this backdrop, "[clomparing the
customary law rule of male primogeniture to the equality and dignity
guarantees of the Constitution, the Court concluded that the customary law
was a clear violation of the Bill of Rights."98
Applying such constitutional principles to customary law will certainly
present a challenge, but the statutory court need not reconcile the two, only
determine whether a particular application of customary law violates
constitutional principles. On remand, it is up to the customary court to
adapt customary law principles to accord with constitutional protections.
Unfortunately, this was not the ultimate outcome of the Bhe decision.
The Constitutional Court did not merely strike down the application of
male primogeniture and leave it for a customary forum to fashion a new
constitutional judgment under customary law.99 Rather, the Court went
further and substituted the statutory provisions for intestate succession,
enforcing a judgment under that law instead.100 As Justice Ngcobo's
94. CONsT. OF THE REP. OF MOZAM. art 43 (2004).
("The constitutional principles in respect of fundamental rights shall be interpreted and
integrated in harmony with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with the African
Charter of Human and Peoples Rights.").
95. See supra text accompanying note 92.
96. Bhe v. Magistrate, Khayelitsha 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) (S. Afr.).
97. Bond, supra note 14, at 327-29.
98. Id. at 328.
99. My recent essay in the Harvard International Review suggests that this was indeed
the outcome of the Bhe litigation, that the task of reinterpreting or revising customary law was
left to a customary forum. Pimentel, Can Indigenous Justice Survive?: Legal Pluralism and the Rule
of Law, supra note 29. it was not. Indeed, in the South African regime, statutory courts
(Magistrates' Courts) have jurisdiction to apply customary law, so the case would not go back
to a customary forum in any case. See Christa Rautenbach, South African Common and
Customary Law of Intestate Succession: A Question of Harmonisation, Integration or Abolition, 12
ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. 1, 3 (May 2008) ("section 54A(1) of the Magistrate's Court Act [in 1988].
. . extended the application of customary law by any court where people from indigenous
communities were involved."), available at http://www.ejcl.org/121/artl2-20.pdf. Thanks to
Sanele Sibanda for educating me on these points. The fault for the earlier mischaracterization
of this aspect of the She decision is entirely my own.
100. Bhe v. Magistrate, Khayelitsha 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) (S. Aft.).
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dissent pointed out, however, the court did not need to go that far.101 It
may have been possible to uphold a gender-neutral version of
primogeniture, for example, that would have been more respectful of the
customary law principles at play.102 South African scholar Sanele Sibanda,
therefore, laments the Bhe case because it, and more particularly the
legislative action in response to it,103 serve to "ossify perceptions of the
inferiority of customary law vis-A-vis the common law." 0 4 He goes on to
clarify, "[w]hat is objectionable is not the idea of reform but that this type of
substitution is termed a reform of customary law."' 05 The more limited
collateral review contemplated and promoted in this Article would avoid
such unfortunate repercussions for customary law.
Perhaps a better analog than the Bhe case for this conception of
collateral review is constitutional court review in civil law jurisdictions in
Europe.106 In Germany, Italy, and Spain, for example, if a statute's
constitutionality is called into question in a case, that case is suspended
while the question of constitutionality is referred to and decided by the
constitutional court.107 The constitutional court does not decide the case, or
dictate what law should apply if the challenged provision is found to be
unconstitutional; rather, the constitutional court merely determines
whether the statute is unconstitutional, and the case goes back to the lower
court for resolution in light of this holding. 08 Similarly, under collateral
review, a statutory court should not decide the outcome of the case or, as
was done in Bhe, substitute another law for the offending customary
provisions. Rather, the case should be sent back for reconsideration under
customary law, in light of the finding of unconstitutionality.
IV. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES AND CHOICES UNDER LEGAL PLURALISM
As already noted, any example of legal pluralism will inevitably raise
difficult issues of jurisdiction and choice of law. The Mozambican
constitution anticipates this, leaving the issues to be addressed through
legislation:
101. Id. at 86 ("In my view, the rule of male primogeniture should be developed in order
to bring it in line with the rights in the Bill of Rights.")
102. Id.
103. The Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act
11 of 2009 (RCSA); Sibanda, supra note 68, at 33 ("After Bhe and the RCSA, the surviving wife
and all the deceased's children are entitled to inherit their share as determined by the Intestate
Succession Act 81 of 1987. The RCSA, among other things, stipulates who may inherit after an
intestate death by departing from the concept of dependents who may inherit in the traditional
African family structure.").
104. Sibanda, supra note 68.
105. Id.
106. Oral comments by Markus Bbckenfirde, Programme Officer, International IDEA, in
Maputo, Mozambique (Apr. 28, 2010), when the author presented an earlier draft of this article
at the international conference: "State and Non-State Public Safety and Justice Provision: The
Dynamics of Legal Pluralism in Mozambique."
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Article 212
Jurisdictional Function
(3) The law may establish institutional and procedural mechanisms
for links between courts and other forums whose purpose is the
settlement of interests and the resolution of disputes. 109
The question is still an open one, therefore, in Mozambique, and for
most of the post-colonial world. When a particular legal claim arises,
which system will have jurisdiction to hear it? Whose law will apply? And
who will decide where it will ultimately be heard? There are several
possible approaches to these questions, and it is helpful to review the full
menu, considering the implications of each for legal pluralism.
A. Concurrent Jurisdiction
The first option is to give both customary and statutory courts
concurrent jurisdiction: either system has authority to hear any case
brought before it. That seems simple enough at first blush. But the
recognition of concurrent jurisdiction only raises more questions. If either
court can hear the case, how is it decided which court will hear the case?
Presumably, a plaintiff can choose to file in either forum, if both have
jurisdiction. One option is to give the plaintiff that right - choice of forum,
and hence choice of law - absolutely. But there may be reasons a defendant
would object to that choice, reasons that may range from the tactical and
strategic to more substantive concerns about whether the plaintiffs chosen
court has the competence or impartiality to do justice in the case. Should
the defendant have a right to seek removal of the case to the other court
system which, after all, has jurisdiction over the case as well? And if so, on
what basis?
Presumably, again, the defendant would have to bring his or her
removal petition in the court chosen by the plaintiff. If the defendant were
permitted to bring some kind of motion in the other court, it would create
the intractable problem of having the case pending in both courts at the
same time, along with the potential for both courts to assert jurisdiction and
render inconsistent judgments.110
If concurrent jurisdiction exists for any or all cases in the plural system,
the court where the case is filed first should have exclusive jurisdiction over
the case. Any attempt to have the case transferred to another court or
another legal system will have to be made with the court presently seized
of the case. As explained below, however, there are compelling reasons to
allow removal, and not permit the "first-to-file" rule to control where the
109. CONST. OF THE REP. OF MOzAM. art. 212(3) (2004).
110. Conversely, it is conceivable that both courts, aware that the case is pending
elsewhere, might decline to hear the case, leaving the plaintiff without meaningful legal
recourse in either forum.
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case will ultimately be heard.
B. Subject-Matter-Based Jurisdiction
It is common to distinguish between types of cases, and allocate
jurisdiction that way. In Kenya, for example, the Magistrates' Courts Act
defines "claims under customary law" to include only certain subject
matter:
(a) land held under customary tenure;
(b) marriage, divorce, maintenance or dowry;
(c) seduction or pregnancy of an unmarried woman or girl;
(d) enticement of or adultery with a married woman;
(e) matters affecting status, and in particular the status of women,
widows and children, including guardianship, custody, adoption
and legitimacy;
(f) intestate succession and administration of intestate estates, so
far as not governed by any written law.'
This statute gives statutory courts explicit jurisdiction over these claims
under customary law. One might just as easily exempt this, or similar,
subject matter from the statutory courts' jurisdiction, reserving exclusive
jurisdiction for those claims in the customary forum.
There is some logic in this, particularly as customary law may have a
lot more to say on some issues - such as family law and succession - than
others. However, there are good reasons for customary courts to retain
criminal jurisdiction: remote and rural communities need to maintain law
and order. Access to justice remains a concern as well. When statutory
courts are inaccessible for large portions of the population, restricting the
subject matter jurisdiction of customary courts may have no other impact
than to deny litigants a forum and a chance to have their claims heard.
In the United States, the federal courts have jurisdiction over "major
crimes" committed in Indian country.112 This decision was made by the
legislature in 1885, based entirely on patronizing attitudes about the
competence of tribal courts to do justice in serious cases. 113 Nonetheless,
111. Magistrates' Courts Act (1967) Cap 10 Part I § 2 (Kenya), available at
http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/GreyBook/5.%20The%20Magistrates%20Courts%20
Act.pdf (last visited June 3, 2010) (although the purpose of this definition does not appear to be
one of allocating jurisdiction to customary courts).
112. Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006) (Originally enacted as Act of Mar. 3, 1885,
ch. 341, § 9,23 Stat. 362 (1885)).
113. Rebecca A. Hart & M. Alexander Lowther, Honoring Sovereignty: Aiding Tribal Efforts
to Protect Native American Women from Domestic Violence, 96 CAL. L. REV. 185,
201-02 (2008). The authors explain:
Congress passed the MCA [Major Crimes Act] in response to the outcome
of Ex Parte Crow Dog, in which the Court held that federal authorities
could not prosecute a member of the Brule Sioux tribe who murdered
another member of the same tribe on the Brule Sioux reservation because
the crime was an intra-tribal issue that had already been adjudicated
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the rules are clear, and everyone knows when the federal court has
jurisdiction, and when jurisdiction is exclusively in the tribal court.
114
C. Ethnic, Tribal, or Community-Based Jurisdiction
If the purpose of legal pluralism is to keep community-based legal
systems working in the communities they serve, it may be appropriate to
restrict the jurisdiction of those systems to the members of that community.
Moreover, there may be manifest injustice in exposing someone outside of
that community to a version of customary law that is foreign to him.
Preserving the collective right of a tribe or community to apply its
customary law in a customary way should not necessarily extend to
imposing their law on outsiders.
Raquel Fajardo provides some perceptive insight on the underlying
policies. She notes that there are two bases for the right to one's own law.
The first, which she characterizes as "cultural," is based on the principle
that "each human person or group has the right to be judged within the
normative system pertaining to their culture." 15 The second, which she
characterizes as "political," concerns "a collective's power to control its
institutions and determine what happens within its territory."116 She draws
heavily on the 1989 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, which
recognizes "the aspirations of the Indigenous Peoples to control their own
institutions."117
according to Brule law. The Department of Justice (Do) viewed
reservations as 'lawless,' and department officials enlisted the help of
Congress to impose law on tribes. The DoJ sought a grant of federal
jurisdiction over crimes in Indian Country, resulting in the MCA giving
federal authorities the power to prosecute certain enumerated 'major
crimes' committed in Indian Country.
(citations omitted). See also Gaylen L. Box, Tribal Sovereignty & Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian
Country, 50 ADVOC. 13, 14 (2007) ("The paternalism of the United States was aimed at
abolishing the pernicious practices of the Indians and demanding respect for law and order
and civilized life ... .").
114. Some courts have held that tribal courts retain concurrent jurisdiction over major
crimes, but they are able to punish them only as if they were misdemeanors. See, e.g., Wetsit v.
Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 825-26 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding a tribal court conviction for manslaughter
and noting concurrent jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act); Warren Stapleton, Indian
Country, Federal Justice: Is the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction Under the Major Crimes Act
Constitutional?, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 337, 342 (1997) ("Today tribal police forces are capable of
investigating and making arrest on cases involving major crimes. In fact, many tribal police
forces already do so, but the offenders are only prosecuted for misdemeanors due to
the punishment restrictions placed on tribal courts by the Indian Civil Rights Act."). The irony
of this result is almost comical in light of the history of the Major Crimes Act. The statute was
passed in reaction to the Crow Dog case in which the tribal court was widely perceived to have
accorded inadequate punishment. If the effect of the current legislative regime in such
circumstances is to ensure that major crimes prosecuted in tribal court are punished lightly,
the statute is now at cross-purposes with its original intent.
115. Fajardo, supra note 54, at 41.
116. Id.
117. International Labour Organization, Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries, No. 169 (1989) available at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdispl.htm.
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In the United States, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court has made
clear that tribal courts have no jurisdiction over non-Indians. 18 The
doctrine was later extended, for a short time, to deny tribal courts criminal
jurisdiction even over Indians, if they were of another tribe. 119 The
sympathies of the U.S. Supreme Court, therefore, are consistent with the
cultural policy: that it is unfair to subject those outside the tribal society to
the tribe's normative system. But because that policy deprives the tribal
community of the power to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians in
Indian country, it undermines the "political" policy, the need for a tribal
community to control what happens in its own territory.120
A corresponding drawback to this approach is that it can severely
restrict the jurisdiction of customary courts, limiting their role in the
community and the easy access to justice they provide. For example, if
such rules applied to family law issues,121 and members of two different
tribes marry each other, neither tribal court would have jurisdiction to
consider a divorce petition. The principle of "maximization" may well be
lost in the application of such a restrictive rule.
A less restrictive, and therefore preferable, variation on this is the
assertion of jurisdiction based on residency rather than formal membership
in the tribe or community. In that scenario, a married couple from different
tribes might still have their divorce adjudicated by a customary court, the
customary court that operates in the community where they resided during
their marriage.
D. Territorial Jurisdiction
Another option is to establish the jurisdiction of the customary court
according to the location where the claim arose. This would involve
drawing boundary lines, which may be difficult politically in some areas.
The fairness and practicality of such an approach may well depend on the
118. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
119. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), superseded by statute, Criminal Jurisdiction Over
Indians Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (1991). Although Congress acted
promptly to restore tribal courts' criminal jurisdiction over Indians of other tribes (in the so-
called Duro-fix legislation), that legislation does not affect civil jurisdiction or the lack of
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
120. Justice Marshall, in his brief dissenting opinion in Oliphant (joined by Chief Justice
Burger and quoted in toto below), highlighted the importance of the political policy:
I agree with the court below that the "power to preserve order on the
reservation.. . is a sine qua non of the sovereignty that the Suquamish
originally possessed." Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (CA9 1976). In
the absence of affirmative withdrawal by treaty or statute, I am of the view
that Indian tribes enjoy, as a necessary aspect of their retained sovereignty,
the right to try and punish all persons who commit offenses against tribal
law within the reservation. Accordingly, I dissent.
Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212 U. Marshall, dissenting). See also infra, Part IV.D Territorial
Jurisdiction, discussing problems of enforcement of petty crime by non-Indians, at notes 124-
25.
121. Both Oliphant and Duro dealt with criminal jurisdiction. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 193-94;
Duro, 495 U.S. at 677.
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degree to which the local community is defined by its territory.
The analog here is the national boundary. Although there are
exceptions, typically a foreign national cannot escape prosecution, by virtue
of her citizenship, in the host state for crimes she commits there. 122
The counter-example again comes from the Native American
community in the United States. As already noted, the tribal courts of an
Indian community have no jurisdiction to prosecute a non-Indian even for
crimes committed on tribal lands.123 Only a federal or state court can
prosecute such an individual.124 This legal doctrine is unfortunate, as it has
given rise to difficulties of law enforcement in Indian country. Federal
prosecutors have higher priorities than petty crimes committed by non-
Indians in Indian country - often situated at great distances from the urban
centers where the federal courts are located. Accordingly, non-Indians
have been able to commit minor offenses (such as shoplifting) with
impunity on Indian reservations.125 Because the territorial lines are very
clearly drawn - the concept of "Indian Country" is defined with great
precision in American law 1 26 - it would be easy to determine and enforce
jurisdiction along such lines. Depriving the tribal courts of jurisdiction over
crimes committed in their own lands emphatically diminishes the authority
and dignity of tribal law and tribal institutions to enforce that law.
The mistakes made in American federal-tribal relations should not be
repeated in post-colonial societies. Customary courts should be
empowered to enforce their own local law, even against outsiders, if the
claim arises in the community in which that court sits. To prescribe
otherwise would do serious damage not only to the principle of
"maximization," but also to law and order - indeed, the rule of law - in that
community.
E. Consent-Based Jurisdiction
Another approach is to prescribe a default jurisdiction but to allow the
parties to agree to have the case heard in another system. For example, the
statutory court might be granted universal jurisdiction, but if both parties
consent to jurisdiction of customary court, the case can be adjudicated there
122. The exception to this general principle is the concept of diplomatic immunity, based
on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, August 18, 1961, 500 UNTS 95, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_11961.pdf. The
Vienna convention makes clear, however, that such immunity applies only to "diplomatic
agents" and their families. Id. arts. 31, 37. It is also clear that the immunity belongs to the
diplomat's government, not to the diplomat herself, meaning the government retains the
power to waive diplomatic immunity and allow its agent to be prosecuted where the crime
occurred. Id. art. 32.
123. Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191.
124. Tribal Justice Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 104th Cong. (1995)
(statement of Hon. William C. Canby, Jr., J. 9th Cir.).
125. Id.; J. Clifford Wallace, A New Era of Federal-Tribal Court Cooperation, 79 JUDICATURE
150, 152-53 (1995).
126. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006).
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instead. Procedurally, the plaintiff could initiate the action in customary
court, which will assert jurisdiction unless the defendant objects in a timely
manner to such jurisdiction. 27 Failure to object would constitute consents
and the customary court would be able to proceed with full jurisdiction.
A variant of this system is in place in Zimbabwe:
When Zimbabwe became independent, the customary courts
established under the colonial administration were not abolished.
Instead, the new government passed the Customary Law and
Primary Courts Act to enhance their operation. The bill, as the name
suggests, integrated the primary courts (the village and community
courts) into the mainstream judicial structure. The courts were
given the jurisdiction to 'hear, try and determine any civil case in
which customary law was applicable,' provided that: the defendant
was a resident within the court's jurisdiction; that the cause of
action arose within the jurisdiction; and that the parties consented
to the court's jurisdiction.129
According to this description, a Zimbabwean customary court has no
jurisdiction unless the parties consent to it. There are other threshold
requirements that must be met - community-based jurisdiction, in terms of
the residency of the litigants, and territorial jurisdiction, in terms of the
place the cause of action arose - but consent is a necessary condition.
The problem with this approach - which requires consent of both
parties for the customary court to assert jurisdiction - is that it too easily
marginalizes the customary courts. 13 0 They become purely optional, akin to
voluntary mediation programs, which are tacked onto existing legal
systems as a form of alternative dispute resolution. Moreover, if the
statutory court is more likely to favor the defendant's position, or if the
defendant believes the plaintiff lacks the resources to pursue her or his case
in statutory court, it is likely that defendants will withhold their consent
and engage in a type of forum shopping. The ability of either party to block
customary court jurisdiction, by withholding consent, therefore seriously
damages the concept of maximization.
A better role for consent-based jurisdiction is to enhance another type
of jurisdiction. For example, if the system confers jurisdiction based on
127. Another variation would require both parties to affirmatively consent to community
court jurisdiction, before jurisdiction could be asserted. Such an "opt-in" procedure, however,
would serve only to further marginalize the customary courts which, as explained infra in this
section, are already marginalized by consent-based jurisdiction to an unfortunate degree.
Rather, it is preferable to take approaches that maximize the role of customary law.
128. Presuming jurisdiction absent an objection is another procedural approach toward
maximizing customary law and customary court jurisdiction.
129. Juma, supra note 36, at 507 (footnotes omitted) (citing Andrew Ladley, Changing the
Courts in Zimbabwe: The Customary Law and Primary Courts Act, 26 J. AFR. L. 95,100,103 (1982)).
130. Of course, the Zimbabwean model is even more marginalizing to the customary
courts, as consent alone is not enough. The statute also requires jurisdiction over the litigants as
residents of the community, and over the claim as arising in the territorial jurisdiction of the
customary forum. This rule violates the "maximization" principle three times over.
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community membership that gave rise to the claim, the outsider would not
normally be subject to the jurisdiction of the customary court, unless he or
she consented to such jurisdiction. Similarly, under a territorial jurisdiction
regime, the parties could consent to customary court jurisdiction over a
claim that arose outside the territorial limits of the customary court's
regular authority. Because consent in these situations would serve to
broaden the jurisdiction already accorded to the customary courts, this use
of consent-based jurisdiction would serve the principle of "maximizing"
customary law.
F. Reconciling the Approach to Jurisdiction
The ideal method system for linking up these traditional fora with the
state regime will vary from state to state and society to society, depending
on the circumstances particular to the pluralism in place. A few key
concepts should govern those choices if legal pluralism is to be functional
and meaningful in a particular society.
1. Presumptive Jurisdiction in the Traditional Forum
As already noted, following the principle of "maximizing" customary
law, the jurisdictional presumptions should tip in that direction, with
customary courts as the presumptive forum for most disputes in rural
African society. As a practical matter, this is already happening in most of
post-colonial Africa; the structure of legal pluralism, of linkages, should be
crafted carefully to avoid undermining what is working at present. Access
to justice issues alone suggest that the rule of law is better served when
most cases enjoy the timely, responsive, and cost-effective adjudication that
customary courts provide, particularly outside of urban centers.' 3 '
Accordingly, the traditional forum should retain the full scope of
jurisdiction that it exercises or historically has exercised. The newly
formalized legal pluralism should in no way limit that jurisdiction. In
many places, this will mean that the traditional forum will have jurisdiction
over disputes between members of that community and disputes that arise
in that community.
These jurisdictional lines may, of course, be difficult to draw if the
community is not clearly constituted, or its territorial boundaries are not
well defined. Nonetheless, the answers will be obvious for a large number
of legal issues, such as divorce proceedings or other domestic disputes. The
wife and husband will have immediate recourse to their village or tribal
forum to settle the dispute.
If a statutory court has concurrent jurisdiction, the plaintiff has a choice
of forum. But the principle of "maximization" suggests that a statutory
court should decline to exercise jurisdiction when a traditional forum is
available that could hear a claim and resolve it. Again, the presumption
131. OPEN SOC'Y INITIATIVE FOR S. AFR. supra note 19, at 121.
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should be that the case goes to the traditional forum. Anyone seeking to
file a claim in statutory court would have to cite a reason why the statutory
court should exercise its jurisdiction to hear the claim, such as (1) the
parties to the dispute are from two different communities, so there is no
obvious community forum to hear the case, (2) the parties to the dispute are
located in the urban center, where the statutory court provides adequate
access to justice, and/or (3) a party to the dispute seeks to assert a right
arising under statute that would not be recognized by the traditional forum.
2. Consent Jurisdiction in the Traditional Forum
A traditional forum is unlikely to claim jurisdiction over disputes
arising elsewhere, or involving "outsiders" who are not a part of the
community served by the traditional dispute resolution body. However, as
already noted, consistent with the "maximization" principle and the
compelling "access to justice" objective, the outsider should be permitted to
waive that objection and consent to the jurisdiction of the traditional forum.
Accordingly, even when the traditional forum would not otherwise enjoy a
presumptive right to jurisdiction, the parties may well prefer to have their
case heard there, rather than incur the expense, logistical difficulty, and
delays associated with litigating in the statutory courts. Consent-based
jurisdiction should be employed to allow that.
3. Forum Shopping
One of the key difficulties with pluralistic systems is that of forum
shopping. If there are different systems applying different rules, each party
is likely to seek resolution of the dispute in the forum whose rules favor his
or her respective legal position.
Instructive here is an example from Israel, which has operated under a
formally-recognized system of legal pluralism for over 50 years. Despite
the sophistication and refinement of that system over the years, it is
vulnerable to this forum shopping problem. The situation is explained by
Susan Weiss, who runs the Center for Women's Justice in Israel, in a recent
story on National Public Radio:
"When you get divorced, you have to decide issues of custody, you
have to decide issues of marital property, you have to decide issues
of visitation rights - all sorts of ... matters that are ancillary to the
issue of divorce," [Weiss] says.
In Israel, there are two courts that have jurisdiction over these
matters, the rabbinical court and the civil or family court. When a
spouse sues the other for divorce, the court that receives the suit
first gets to decide on issues like custody and property. What has
developed is a race that can sometimes come down to a matter of
minutes.
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"If you're a woman, you want to race to the family court, because
you want the family court deciding how much child support your
husband pays for the kids or if he owes you alimony," Weiss says.
"And men usually run to the rabbinic courts because they have a
tactical advantage in the rabbinic courts." 132
This type of forum shopping - this race to the courthouse - is
problematic for two reasons. First, it appears to reward gamesmanship at
the expense of justice. Second, it encourages litigation as opposed to
cooperation in addressing disputes. A marriage that has encountered
difficulties may well be salvageable; similarly an unexpected disruption of
a contractual relationship might be resolved simply and easily through
open negotiation. But if both parties in each of these situations has
incentives to file immediately for divorce or for breach - lest the other party
initiate the action first in a less-friendly forum - the "first to file" rule for
venue will result in premature and unnecessary court filings, contributing
to an overly litigious society.
The need to discourage this type of forum shopping is another reason
to establish presumptive jurisdiction in the traditional forum. If the
statutory court will defer to the traditional forum, and decline to exercise
jurisdiction in cases where the traditional forum appears capable of
resolving the dispute, there is no incentive to rush to initiate the action
early in statutory court. The appropriateness of the forum, rather than
timing, should control the venue question.133
V. APPLICATION TO MOZAMBIQUE
Mozambique's specific situation poses challenges for the effort to
regularize and systematize legal pluralism. As an initial matter, a simple
dichotomy between statutory and customary courts does not exist there.
Not only are there multiple fora for dispute resolution, but they do not fall
neatly into clean and simple categories. Competing with the statutory
courts are a variety of other institutions engaged in dispute resolution in
Mozambican society.
This is not to suggest that Mozambique is unique. Indeed, the issues
that arise with its attempt to establish legal pluralism are representative of
the problems throughout the region - problems that have resulted from the
culture and history of post-colonial Africa. The purpose of the discussion
concerning Mozambique is to illustrate, with greater specificity, how the
issues arise in the real world, and how proposed solutions can and cannot
132. Lourdes Garcia-Navarro, Under Israel's Divorce Laws, Men Get the Final Word, NAT'L
PUB. RADIO (Apr. 7, 2010), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld= 125673859.
133. Of course, there are compelling advantages to a "first-to-file" rule, most notably the
ease of application. The question of appropriateness, or "whether the traditional forum is
capable of resolving the dispute," is a far more difficult standard to apply.
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be implemented. A brief history of Mozambique since independence is
necessary for context.
A Portuguese possession, for all practical purposes since as early as
1500, Mozambique saw an independence movement gain strength in the
1960s:
[I]n 1962 several anti-colonial political groups formed the Front for
the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which initiated an
armed campaign against Portuguese colonial rule in September
1964. After 10 years of sporadic warfare and major political changes
in Portugal, Mozambique became independent on June 25, 1975.
When independence was achieved in 1975, the leaders of
FRELIMO's military campaign rapidly established a one-party state
allied to the Soviet bloc and outlawed rival political activity.
FRELIMO eliminated political pluralism, religious educational
institutions, and the role of traditional authorities. 134
A rebel alliance called the Mozambican National Resistance
(RENAMO) emerged, funded and supported by the neighboring
governments of Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa. 135 A bloody civil war
ensued, tearing the country apart, killing an estimated one million, and
displacing many millions more.136 Ultimately, in the mid-1980s the
FRELIMO government conceded the failure of socialism and began peace
talks with RENAMO.13 7 In 1990, a new constitution was enacted which
provided for a multi-party system, a market-based economy, and free
elections.138 The war ended with a peace agreement in 1992, and although
the fighting has stopped, FRELIMO and RENAMO remain the primary
forces in Mozambican politics.139
134. U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Background Note: Mozambique,
available at http://www.state.gov/r/ pa/ei/ bgn/7035.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2010).
135. Id.
136. Id., explaining:
Civil war, sabotage from neighboring states, and economic collapse
characterized the first decade of Mozambican independence. Also marking
this period were the mass exodus of Portuguese nationals, weak
infrastructure, nationalization, and economic mismanagement. During
most of the civil war, the government was unable to exercise effective
control outside of urban areas, many of which were cut off from the
capital.
137. Id. ("In the third FRELIMO party congress in 1983, President Samora Machel
conceded the failure of socialism and the need for major political and economic reforms. He
died, along with several advisers, in a suspicious 1986 plane crash. His successor, Joaquim
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A. The Community Courts (formerly known as Popular Courts)
The community courts are the successor to the "popular courts,"
established in the "revolutionary" period (1975-1984) when socialist
ideology prevailed in newly-independent Mozambique.140  The
predominant view during early independence was that traditional or
community cultures, and whatever dispute resolution systems they
employed, should be rejected in favor of revolutionary socialist institutions.
The earlier institutions were deemed products of colonialism, incompatible
with the new independent state. 141 In time, the government concluded that
traditional cultures could be selectively co-opted to serve the socialist cause;
this resulted in the formation of "popular courts." 142
After democratic culture took hold as a successor to socialism in
Mozambique in the mid-1980s, the "community courts" became a successor
to the popular courts. Created in 1992, these community courts retained
not only elements of traditional culture, but aspects of socialist culture as
well, if only because many of the popular court judges were retained as
judges of the community courts.143
Community courts are widespread throughout Mozambique - with
1,653 identified in a 2004 Ministry of Justice Report - although no one
seems to know just how many of these are actively functioning.144 The lack
of personnel and lack of financial support have presumably led a number of
them to close down, or at least to fall dormant.145
B. The Reigulos System and Other Local Leaders
The rtgulos system in Mozambique is sometimes characterized as the
heir to traditional or customary law and procedure in the Mozambican
communities. This is a somewhat misleading characterization. Rather, the
rdgulos system was a direct product of Portuguese colonial rule, an attempt
to "interact with the existing lineage structures by instituting a system of
traditional authority,"146 by applying traditional rules and values. "Put
simply, in theory the rtgulo was the 'traditional' authority, in accordance
with customary laws, in practice rtgulos administered formal law, and to all
intents, the rtgulos should have been considered government officers." 147
This perception of the rigulos undoubtedly accounts for the post-
140. De Sousa Santos, supra note 11, at 47-50.
141. Id. at 48-49.
142. Id. This follows a pattern in socialist revolutionary culture, seen also in Nepal,
where the Maoists established "people's courts" in the local communities, simultaneously
heralded for providing meaningful access to justice to the people, and condemned for failing
to adhere to minimal standards of justice and due process. David Pimentel, Constitutional
Concepts for the Rule of Law: A Vision for the Post-Monarchy Judiciary in Nepal, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL
STUD. L. REV. 283 (2010).
143. De Sousa Santos, supra note 11 at 49-50.
144. OPEN SOC'Y INITIATIVE FOR S. AFR., supra note 19, at 127.
145. Id.
146. Convery, supra note 37, at 451.
147. Id.
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independence marginalization of the rtgulos system, as the ruling
FRELIMO party sought to diminish all legacies of colonialism. But in some
parts of the country these traditional leaders continued to command
deference and respect in their communities. 148
The RENAMO opposition, of course, seized this as a political
opportunity, championing traditional systems, reflecting traditional
customs and norms that remained popular in rural areas. They attempted
to characterize the FRELIMO government as "hostile to African society."'149
Accordingly, the rtgulo system continues to operate in various areas of
Mozambique, particularly those central areas dominated by the RENAMO
party.150 However, the rtgulo system is not found in the urban and
suburban areas where the FRELIMO government has established state
administration.15
Obviously, the rigulos who still function are no longer serving the
colonial power, or even the newly-independent state which, under the
FRELIMO government, has sought to ignore them.152 With the help of
RENAMO, the rigulos have been recast as traditional leaders of traditional
African society, embodying the whole system of traditional customs and
norms.
In addition to the rtgulos, there are other locally elected leaders, called
secretdrios, who may play dispute resolution roles in the bairro
(neighborhood or town) or in the povoagdo (village). 53 In some cases the
rtgulo and the secretirio may be the same person.5 4
C. Community/Tribal Authorities
In addition to the rtgulos and secretdrios, there are dispute resolution
authorities in the local communities or tribes. They often function through
small consultative councils or larger community councils which assemble to
hear and resolve disputes according to traditional principles of equity. 55
Concerns have been raised about how well these fora adhere to
constitutional principles and human rights standards,156 but there is little
question that they play a large role in resolving disputes and maintaining
148. Id. at 452.
149. Convery, supra note 37, at 452 (citing Giovani M. Carboni, Emerging Pluralist Politics
in Mozambique: The FRELIMO-RENAMO Party System 4 (London School of Economics,
Development Research Centre Working Paper, 2003), attributing this quote to RENAMO
leader Dhalakama).
150. Convery, supra note 37, at 452.
151. Id.
152. Id. (citing Jos6 Negrao, Land and Rural Development in Mozambique (1995)
(unpublished paper presented at the Workshop on Integrated Analysis and Management of
Renewable Natural Resources in Mozambique, 7-11 June 1999, proceedings edited by P.V.
Desauber & L. Santos)).
153. OPEN Soc'Y INITIATIVE FOR S. AFR., supra note 19, at 129-30.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 133.
156. Id.
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order in local communities.157
D. Dispute Resolution by Religious Authorities and Traditional
Healers
Religious groups and traditional healers, including AMETRAMO (the
Mozambican Association of Traditional Healers), can also play an
important role in resolving conflicts in the community. These actors tend to
draw upon moral principles and moral suasion to help wrongdoers take
responsibility for their actions. One curandeira (traditional healer) in
Maputo noted that when her efforts, and those of the association, fail, they
"call upon [their] xehe [a Muslim scholar] to come and solve it through
Islamic law."' 58
Resort to Muslim authorities occurs primarily in the central and
northern areas where Islam is dominant.159 Traditional healers are relied
upon heavily in cases involving witchcraft allegations.160
E. Sorting the Pluralistic Adjudicatory Authorities
Under our "maximization" principle, presumptive jurisdiction over all
disputes should rest with local, traditional authorities. Many of these
institutions and individuals are playing a vital role in resolving disputes in
their respective communities, and they do it through the application of
principles that reflect the culture, tradition, and heritage of those same
communities. Any implementation of Articles 4 and 212 of the 2004
Constitution should be done with caution to avoid harming or
undermining the very mechanisms now maintaining the rule of law in rural
Mozambique.
The mechanisms established for pluralism should provide, to the extent
possible, equal dignity to these non-state fora. The problem for
Mozambique is determining which non-state fora are entitled to such
presumption and deference.
157. Maria Paula Meneses, Traditional Authorities in Mozambique: Between Legitimisation
and Legitimacy, OFICINA Do CES. 231, 19 (2005) ("Amongst all the entities involved in
community justice, the traditional authorities and their law have, for a long time, been the
most significant."), available at http://hdl.handle.net/10316/11125.
158. OPEN SOC'Y INITIATIVE FOR S. AFR., supra note 19, at 134.
159. De Sousa Santos, supra note 11, at 60 ("Because it does not recognize any strong
distinction between the religious and the nonreligious, the Islamic faith tends to regulate social
life as a whole.").
160. Id. at 69 ("Even in the revolutionary period, the popular courts would often turn to
the traditional healers in order to solve cases involving witchcraft accusations.") (citing Maria
Paula Meneses, et al., As Autoridades Tradicionais no Contexto do Pluralismo Juridico, in CONFLITo
E TRANSFORMAQAO SOCIAL: UMA PALSAGEM DAS JUSTICAS EM MOGAMBIQUE (B. S. Santos & J. C.
Trindade, eds., 2003)); Juma, supra note 36; Meneses, supra note 157, at 25 ("When the case
involves witchcraft accusations, the presence of traditional healers becomes central.").
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1. The Perils of Formal Recognition of Non-State Authorities
If the state engages in an accreditation process, designating which of
these local authorities are entitled to recognition and deference, the whole
system will be quickly politicized and corrupted. The rtgulos system itself
is precedent, where local authorities were recognized, but only to further
the interests of the colonizing power. As noted above, the legislature in
Southern Sudan is repeating the mistakes of colonialism on precisely this
issue, by politicizing the recognition of tribal chiefs.161
This latter concern is even more acute in Mozambique, where the
opposition party has long championed the power and authority of
traditional leaders. If the central government is going to play any role in
deciding or designating which traditional leaders will be formally
recognized under Article 4, it is impossible to imagine that it could be
carried out without the taint of political bias or corruption.
2. Staying True to the Spirit of Article 4: Recognizing Them All
Given the problems inherent in picking and choosing between
traditional fora, the default should be to recognize them all. Any
customary or community authority - community courts, rtgulos, traditional
authorities, even religious authorities and traditional healers - may be
accorded jurisdiction to resolve disputes among those in the relevant
community. Given the melange of systems present in Mozambique at
present, it is likely that any attempt to distinguish these fora on a scale of
legitimacy is destined to fail. That is precisely the type of intervention that
will do more harm than good, damaging local institutions' effectiveness in
maintaining the rule of law in their own communities.
3. The More General Risk of Articulating Detailed Linkages
The risks associated with establishing formal linkages do not stop with
the state's recognition of traditional authorities. Virtually any well-defined
linkage mechanism will serve to over-assert state authority and undermine
the autonomy and efficacy of traditional fora.
The reason any attempt at close integration of state and non-state
systems is likely to fail is that the systems are built on entirely different, and
in some cases mutually exclusive, cultural assumptions. Even the
underlying principle of justice may be conceived quite differently -
particularly as community-based systems often reflect the values of
restorative justice, while statutory systems are more likely to reflect
retributive justice models, consistent with their civil law antecedents in the
Portuguese legal system. The resulting misunderstandings could serve to
damage both systems.
In order to "maximize" customary law, its "linkage" with statutory
161. See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
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courts should be minimized. The power of collateral review can be invoked
as a check on human rights violations by traditional authorities. But
otherwise, the operative principle should be one of "delinking." If they are
to retain their vitality and functionality, traditional dispute resolution fora
must be left alone to apply and develop their own traditional law and to
exercise traditional authority in their own communities, without oversight
or meddling by state authorities. Statutory courts should intervene only to
address compelling human rights violations, and even then only in the
most narrowly tailored way.
It will be impossible to articulate a system of linkages that could
seamlessly correlate and integrate the diverse and divergent legal
structures now operating in Mozambique. Any attempt to do so is unlikely
to result in a functional structure, responsive to the needs of the full
spectrum of Mozambican society. Because most of these systems are
working, and providing some culturally-appropriate approximation of
justice in a way the statutory courts could never hope to do, they should be
accorded as much autonomy and deference as possible, consistent with
basic principles of human rights.
The awkward gaps and overlaps that will inevitably emerge as these
plural systems attempt to function side-by-side can be sorted out on a case-
by-case basis. Some of the most nettlesome issues, such as the jurisdiction
of the traditional authorities, already are the subject of ad hoc and
pragmatic solutions; indeed, these entities are functioning and having a real
impact, even now. As new conflicts and issues emerge, they can be dealt
with by the courts themselves, applying the more general guiding
principles of "maximizing" indigenous law and striving for equal dignity
for the traditional adjudication fora.
CONCLUSION
There are no easy answers for how to correlate and link pluralistic
adjudication in post-colonial African states, and Mozambique presents a
typically troublesome case. Although the precise mechanisms cannot be
articulated with specificity, the core underlying principles can. Those
principles should respect traditional systems and values, affording them
dignity as independent systems. Making these principles or traditional
systems subservient to state institutions, allowed to exist as long as they
serve the state institutions on the state's terms, would be nothing more than
repackaging and relabeling tried-and-failed colonial approaches.
Instead, the pluralistic regime should operate on the principle of
"maximizing" the role and impact of indigenous law, and giving equal
dignity to the institutions that apply such law. This will require state courts
to defer to community-based adjudication, even declining to exercise
jurisdiction when the case can be appropriately resolved in the latter forum.
It will grant concurrent jurisdiction wherever possible, supplementing it
with consent jurisdiction for those who could not otherwise be subject to
the authority of the traditional forum.
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The most troubling aspects of traditional law, the oft-cited human
rights violations, cannot be ignored. A mechanism can and must be
developed for guarding against such violations, doing as little violence as
possible to the autonomy and dignity of traditional fora. A system of
collateral review - giving statutory courts limited jurisdiction to review a
traditional forum's decision for compliance with constitutional human
rights standards - can serve that function. Such a system is calculated to
tamper with traditional dispute resolution systems as little as possible, and
to respect the community forum as much as possible. Most importantly, it
allows customary law to respond in its own way to the human rights
requirements, not threatening customary law with restrictions, but
strengthening customary law by fostering its legitimacy and relevance.
For better or for worse, Mozambique has embraced the concept of legal
pluralism. Sensitive implementation will help ensure that it is better, and
not worse. Operational solutions will require ongoing attention, but the
benefits and values of pluralism can be maintained as long as the
implementation does not stray from these core principles: maximization of
indigenous law and equal dignity for the traditional fora.
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